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FAIR PRICE AND FAIR PLAY UNDER THE
MONTANA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
John J. Oitzinger"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Legislature, with the able assistance and sup-
port of the Montana State Bar Association and several special
law revision committees, has worked very hard over the past ten
years to provide Montanans with modern, up-to date versions of
basic corporate laws. In 1991, with only a single negative vote,'
the legislature enacted an essentially unchanged version of the
American Bar Association's Revised Model Business Corporation
Law' and revised the Montana Nonprofit Corporation Act,'
based on the American Bar Association's Model Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Act. These laws were preceded by the Close Corporation
Supplement in 1987" and followed by the Montana Limited Lia-
bility Company Act in 1993. The legislature also extensively
amended Montana's partnership law in 1993 and 1995 to allow
the creation of "limited liability partnerships."' Legislative ef-
forts to conform Montana laws to the uniform acts continued in
1997 with the enactment of Senate Bill 329, which adopted the
1985 amendments to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and
made several conforming changes to the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act and the Montana Limited Liability Act.'
* Practicing attorney in Helena, Montana with emphasis on business and
commercial matters. Received B.S. in 1961 from the University of Notre Dame and
LL.B. in 1965 from Fordbam University School of Law. Practiced in New York, New
York as a partner in a large law firm before moving to Montana in 1979. Created
and maintains a "Montana Business Law Center" website featuring legislation and
Montana Supreme Court decisions relating to corporate and securities laws.
1. See Stephen C. Bahis, Montana's New Business Corporation Act: Duties,
Dissension, Derivative Actions and Dissolution, 53 MONT. L. REV. 3, 4 n.1 (1992).
2. See Montana Business Corporation Act, ch. 368, 1991 Mont. Laws 876 (cod-
ified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-112 to -1312 (1995)).
3. See Montana Nonprofit Corporation Act, ch. 411, 1991 Mont. Laws 1291
(codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-113 to -1402 (1995)).
4. Montana Close Corporation Act, ch. 432, 1987 Mont. Laws 950 (codified as
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-101 to -504 (1995)). See generally Stephen C.
Bahls & Marcelle Compton Quist, The ABA Model Statutory Close Corporation Act: A
New Opportunity for "Made in Montana" Corporations, 49 MONT. L. REV. 66 (1988).
5. See Montana Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 120, 1993 Mont. Laws 269
(codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1995)).
6. See Registration of Limited Liability Partnerships, ch. 449, 1995 Mont. Laws
2092 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-701 to -710 (1995)).
7. See S.B. 329, 55th Leg. (Mont. 1997).
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The 1991 Montana Business Corporation Act,8 the center-
piece of these legislative initiatives, was derived from the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act, which reflected a decade
or more of work by the American Bar Association's Committee on
Corporate Laws. At the same time, the Reporters of the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance were mak-
ing a parallel effort to state the corporate common law.9 These
efforts took on special urgency because of the flood of litigation
that was occurring throughout the county. The authors of a book
on the business judgment rule commented that between their
third edition in 1989 and their fourth edition in 1993, more than
550 new cases had been decided. Of those, 330 were decided be-
tween 1991 and 1993.10
While this furious activity occurred in other states, share-
holder litigation before the Montana Supreme Court was consid-
erably less frequent." In a 1992 article in the Montana Law
Review, Professor Stephen C. Bahls identified five "major" deci-
sions since 1980.2 However, from 1992 to 1995, the Montana
Supreme Court decided no cases involving corporate law issues
and, in 1996, decided only two.'3 While cases in the early 1980s
were favorable to minority shareholders, it has been fourteen
years since the supreme court decided a case in favor of a minor-
ity shareholder.14
8. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-112 to -1312 (1995).
9. See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANAL-
YSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE]. Unlike the Restatements, the Principles of Corporate Governance presents
analysis and recommendations, recognizing that the law is evolving rapidly and, in
many cases, is not settled. The Notes accompanying the "black letter" recommenda-
tions distinguish between situations in which the law is clear and those in which
there is a split of authority or a need for legislation to implement the recommenda-
tions.
10. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, preface (4th ed. 1993) [hereinafter BLOCK, THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE].
11. The number of corporate law cases decided in the 1980s, nevertheless, far
exceeds the number of cases decided in earlier decades and, so far, in the 1990s.
12. See BahIs, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins,
Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990); Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 227
Mont. 51, 737 P.2d 475 (1987); Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230
(1983); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc., 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981)).
13. See McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann, 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239
(1996); Stufft v. Stuift, 276 Mont. 310, 916 P.2d 104 (1996).
14. See Maddox, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (remanding district court's determi-
nation of value of minority shares); see also Fox, 298 Mont. 197, 645 P.2d 939 (order-
ing liquidation based on continuing deadlock); Skierka, 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214
[Vol. 58
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Although the 1991 Montana Business Corporation Act does
not seem to have contributed to the unfavorable decisions for
minority shareholders, several of the new provisions do increase
the barriers to a successful challenge to managerial conduct by
minority shareholders. The drafters intended to balance these
changes with the more readily available relief provided by
dissenters' rights and, at least in the case of close corporations,
by court-ordered dissolution or other alternatives, usually a
forced buy-out of the minority shareholder. These remedies de-
pend upon a valuation policy that treats the minority sharehold-
er with entire fairness, which consists of two basic aspects: fair
dealing and fair price. 5
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court may have upset
this balance with its 1996 decision in McCann Ranch, Inc. v.
Quigley-McCann."5 In McCann Ranch, the court held that a
twenty-five percent discount was appropriate in determining the
fair value of the minority stock interest in question. 7 Unless
carefully limited to its facts, the decision puts Montana among a
minority of states that allow such a discount in a transaction
between a minority shareholder and a controlling shareholder or
the corporation itself.
Given the sweeping changes in the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act and the recurring legislative efforts to provide uni-
form and up-to-date statutes, the judiciary should strive toward
the most uniform and up-to-date interpretations of the law. The
Principles of Corporate Governance represents the companion
interpretive guide to the Model Act, and Montana courts should
draw upon the analysis and recommendations expressed therein.
If a satisfactory decisional framework still cannot be developed,
guidance should be sought in the recent decisions in other states,
particularly those in which the courts have regular experience in
considering the issues. Prior decisions of the Montana courts
should be weighted according to how closely they approximate
the results that would be obtained under the current statutory
and analytic framework. Courts and litigants should pay particu-
lar attention to conflicting interest transactions as defined in the
(finding oppression of minority shareholder). But see McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont.
205, 915 P.2d 239; Daniels, 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359.
15. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
16. 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239 (1996).
17. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 208-11, 915 P.2d at 241-43. The de-
cision also stated, in dictum, that the conduct of the controlling shareholders did not
amount to oppression. See id. at 211, 915 P.2d at 243.
1997] 409
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Montana Business Corporation Act and the Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance.
Part II of this Article provides background on the Model Act
and the Principles of Corporate Governance as a framework for
analyzing business conduct and judicial decisions. Part III de-
scribes remedies available under Montana's Business Corpora-
tion Act, including a determination of fair value, discusses the
majority and minority views in other states, and concludes with
a detailed analysis of the McCann Ranch decision. Part III fur-
ther analyzes the application of discounts in arriving at fair
value for shares, separately and in combination with breaches of
the duty of fair dealing by directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders. Part IV describes the common law and statutory
duties of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders as em-
bodied in the Model Act and the Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance. Part IV then applies these principles to Montana cases
and speculates how these cases may have been decided under
the new law and principles.
II. REVISED MODEL ACT AND PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
The first Model Business Corporation Act, drafted in 1950,
was based on the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1935.18 In
1968, Montana adopted the 1960 version of the Model Business
Corporation Act 9 and, in 1991, adopted the substantially differ-
ent Revised Model Business Corporation Act (hereinafter "Model
Act").20 Although the initial Model Business Corporation Act
tried to embody a middle-of-the-road corporate scheme,2 ' the
18. See Ray Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business
Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAW. 1 (1950).
19. See Hugh V. Shaefer, The Status of the Adoption of the Model Business Cor-
poration Act in Montana-A Commentary, 36 MONT. L. REV. 29 (1975).
20. See Bahls, supra note 1, at 4. The Model Act was first adopted in 1984 and
was amended significantly in 1988 with the adoption of subpart F, directors conflict-
ing interest transactions, and in 1990 with the adoption of subchapter D, termination
of derivative actions (now MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, ch. 7, subch. D (1994)). See Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAw. 695 (1990).
21. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1960), Off. Cmts. The Comments state:
The Committee on Corporate Laws presented the Model Act as a modem
statute that preserves in proper balance the interest of the state and the
rights and interests of corporations, shareholders and management ....
The Model Act is not designed for particular application to large or small
corporations but on the premise that a corporation statute, properly drawn,
could and should serve equally the requirements of large and small corpo-
410 [Vol. 58
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Model Act is the product of the American Bar Association (ABA)
Committee on Corporate Laws, a group dominated by large firm
lawyers and corporate counsel for several Fortune 500 compa-
nies." The closed twenty-five member Committee on Corporate
Laws is able to make final decisions without prior approval of
the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law or
its Board of Governors.23 Not surprisingly, the Committee's de-
cisions have tended to favor corporate management. 24
The Model Act makes three major changes that affect direc-
tor and officer liability.' First, it authorizes provisions in the
articles of incorporation that effectively eliminate director liabili-
rations and the fair treatment of the shareholders of each.
See also, Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act:
Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 259 (1993);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business
Corporation Act Annotated, 29 BuS. LAw. 1407 (1974).
22. See Branson, supra note 21, at 260.
23. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455,
1458 (1985).
24. Although it does not mention any of the activities of the Committee on Cor-
porate Laws, a recent book catalogs instances of excessively zealous representation of
large corporate clients, primarily relating to discovery abuses. RALPH NADER AND
WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUS-
TICE IN AMERICA (1996). "Until the early 1970's the members of the Committee on
Corporate Laws were almost exclusively lawyers from a handful of big cities and
from major firms whose clients were predominantly large, publicly held corporations."
Supra note 23, at 1458. As of 1984-85, when the Revised Business Corporation Act
was published, the Committee included one or two attorneys who represent plaintiffs
in derivative litigation and two or three law professors. "However, even with these
changes, corporate attorneys from large firms continue their numerical dominance of
the Committee on Corporate Laws membership." Id.
25. At present, Montana is one of only a handful of states that have adopted
the derivative suit provisions in their entirety. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.,
subch. D, Derivative Proceedings (3d ed., 1985) (Supp. 1996). Montana and North
Carolina adopted in full section 7.40 (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-541 (1995)). See MOD-
EL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-262. Montana, Indiana, Kentucky, Virginia and Wiscon-
sin, adopted section 7.41 (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-542 (1995)). See MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-341. Montana, Virginia and Wisconsin adopted section 7.42
virtually unchanged, Demand (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-543 (1995)). See MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-345. Montana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming adopted
section 7.43, Stay of Proceedings (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-544 (1995)). See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-346. Only Montana and Wisconsin have adopted with
little substantive change, the key dismissal provision, section 7.44 (MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-545 (1995)). See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-356. Montana, Arkansas,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming adopted the uncontroversial section 7.45,
Discontinuance or Settlement (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-546 (1995)). See MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-358. Only Montana and Wisconsin adopted unchanged the at-
torney fee provision, section 7.46, Payment of Expenses (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
547 (1995)). See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-360.
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ty for breaches of the duty of care.2" Second, it creates a safe
harbor procedure for conflicting interest transactions, which
narrows and weakens shareholder protection from breaches of
the duty of loyalty (or the duty of fair dealing).27 Finally, it au-
thorizes directors to terminate derivative suits and limits judicial
review of their decision to terminate.28 As a result of these
changes, some have criticized the Model Act for catering exces-
sively to the needs of the Fortune 500 and attacked it as the
"death knell" for main street business applications.29
During the decade or so in which the ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws redrafted the Model Act, the American Law
Institute (ALI) Project on Corporate Governance sought to "codi-
fy," in restatement-like rules, the common law of corporations?
The effort followed on the heels of the ALI's drafting of the Fed-
eral Securities Code from 1969 to 1978. While the Federal Secu-
rities Code considered the scope of the responsibilities of officers
and directors of publicly-held corporations, it was necessarily
limited by the nature of federal securities law, which stresses
disclosure and governs substantive corporate law only tangen-
tially.3 Under the direction of Ray Garrett, Jr., former chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Project on
Corporate Governance evolved into a restatement of the law,
26. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2Xd) (1995). This section allows the arti-
cles of incorporation to include:
[A] provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corpo-
ration or its shareholders for money damages for any actions taken or any
failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for: (i) the amount
of a financial benefit received by a director to which the director is not
entitled; (ii) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the
shareholders; (iii) a violation of 35-1-713 [unlawful distributions]; or (iv) an
intentional violation -of criminal law.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d) (1995).
27. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-461 to -464 (1995). The corresponding portion
of the Model Act is located at MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60 through 8.64 (1994).
28. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545 (1995). The universal demand provision
overrules S-W Co. v. John Wight, Inc., 179 Mont. 392, 587 P.2d 348 (1978). The new
law also conflicts with the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Zapata v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). There, the scope of review included the normal
review of the special litigation committee's independence and diligence as well as a
"second step" to review of the merits of the allegations and the committee's analysis
of them. See id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(1) (1995); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
7.44(a) (1994) (stating that "section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review the
reasonableness of the determination . .. the phase in section 7.44 ... limits judicial
review to whether the determination has some support in the findings of the inqui-
ry"); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44, at 7-355 (Supp. 1996).
29. See Branson, supra note 21, at 279.
30. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at XVIII-XIX.
31. See id. at XVI.
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which included recommendations. 32 The Project on Corporate
Governance was intended to lead, rather than merely follow, the
development of the law, as clearly expressed by Chairman
Garrett:
Where there is no judicial authority, or where the cases are
unsatisfactory by modern standards-either because of their
antiquity, or the absence of compelling analysis, or because
today, they just seem wrong-resort must be had to other
sources. These may include the literature on the subject, the
better corporate practice in the view of those experienced in the
field, not limited to lawyers, and ultimately to the judgment of
the Institute, aided by the Reporter and his Advisers. Where
the Project is not in fact restating the cases, the Institute's
views should take the form of recommendations, which may
include recommended statutory provisions, state or federal.'
Each section is followed by two comments: Comment a, which
describes the current state of the law, gives analysis and recom-
mendations, and notes where there is a split of authority; and
Comment b, which states whether the analysis and recommenda-
tions can be implemented by judicial decision or whether new
legislation is necessary.'
The overlapping efforts by the ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws and the reporters of the ALI Corporate Governance Project
required these two groups to interact and led to a certain
amount of friction where their objectives have differed. The ABA
formed an ad hoc committee, CORPRO, to act as liaison with the
ALI Project on Corporate Governance. CORPRO sought to influ-
ence the ALI proposals by claiming they were beyond the scope
of existing case law. Ironically, the ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws' amendments to the Model Act were at least as much on
the cutting edge, and outside established case law, as those pro-
posed by the ALI Project on Corporate Governance. The Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws attempted to cut the ALI "off at the
pass" by pushing states to adopt the Model Act before the ALI's
annual meeting in 1992.' The ALI needed the approval of its
broad and diverse membership, which includes judges, general
practitioners and academics practicing in fields other than cor-
porate law, to complete the Project. CORPRO and the Business
32. See id. at XVIII-XIX.
33. Id. at XIX.
34. See id. at XXV-XXVI.
35. See Branson, supra note 21, at 281-84.
1997] 413
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Roundtable, an organization of the Chief Executive Officers of
the 100 largest companies in the United States, conducted a "get
out the vote" campaign and actively lobbied the membership of
the ALI to kill the Corporate Governance Project."
In response, the Director of the ALI, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
sent a letter to the membership before the annual meeting in
May 1992, reminding members of the need to formulate balanced
positions and asking any members attending the meeting with
voting instructions from corporate clients to leave the meeting.37
Perhaps reflecting the intensity of this struggle, Professor Haz-
ard inflated the importance of the ALI's work somewhat:
This statement of Principles of Corporate Governance is a ma-jor contribution to the fundamental law of economic systems
that operate through privately owned business enterprises.
Viewing the American political economy in broad perspective,
the law of corporate governance is a part of our constitutional
law, that is, the legal structure of our basic social order. To be
sure, corporate law is not entrenched in clauses of the United
States Constitution. However, this body of law reflects common
understanding of the key legal relationships in the corporation,
particularly the publicly-held corporation-those among the
shareholders, directors, and management. These legal relation-
ships are fundamental to the American capitalist system.'
In light of this tumultuous history, it is not surprising that
the two major corporate law efforts of the second half of this
century are not always harmonious. While the reporters of the
Principles of Corporate Governance were obviously very con-
cerned about the management of large and medium-sized public-
ly-held corporations, they clearly expressed their intention that
the analysis and recommendations apply to all corporations. The
drafters of the Model Act expressed a similar intention,39 and
one may assume that the drafters of the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act intended it to apply to closely-held corporations as
well as large public companies.' Because the Model Act consid-
36. See id. at 282.
37. See id. at 282 n.91.
38. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at IX.
39. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT XVII (1994) ("Act is designed for use by both
publicly held and closely held corporations, and takes into account the rights and
duties of their shareholders, officers, directors, and the corporation itself, as well as
the interests of the state.").
40. Since virtually all Montana corporations are closely held, the 1991 amend-
ments were obviously intended to apply to small as well as large corporations.
414 [Vol. 58
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erably weakens the protections offered minority shareholders for
breaches of fiduciary duties, the reporters of the ALI Project on
Corporate Governance recognized the need to counterbalance
majority control by providing an entirely fair appraisal reme-
dy.41 The reporters noted and encouraged judicial efforts to
strengthen the fair price determination in the appraisal process,
particularly where the transaction in question is not a true
arms-length transaction.42
III. FAIR PRICE
A. Dissenters' Rights
Under the common law of corporations in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, a corporation could not
undertake certain fundamental changes, such as a merger or
sale of assets, without unanimous shareholder approval.' The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized this "vested" right of a share-
holder in its much-cited opinion in Voeller v. Neilston Co.:"
At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prereq-
uisite to fundamental changes in the corporation. This made it
possible for an arbitrary minority to establish a nuisance value
for its shares by refusal to cooperate. To meet the situation,
legislatures authorized the making of changes by majority vote.
This, however, opened the door to victimization of the minority.
To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting minority
to recover the appraised value of its shares, were widely adopt-
ed.'
In 1976, the drafters of the Model Act attempted to remove
technical and procedural barriers to its dissenters' rights provi-
sions, while still addressing the criticism from corporate manage-
ment that shareholders' demands for appraisals were an attempt
to coerce the corporation into making a nuisance settlement or
were driven by fanciful concepts of valuation." The drafters
41. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 291-96.
42. See id. § 7.22, at 291-96, 316-18 cmt. c.
43. See generally Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941); Breniman v.
Agricultural Consultants, Inc., 829 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo. App. 1992); 2 PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 296; 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 13-8
to 13-9 (Supp. 1996); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (1984).
44. 311 U.S. 531, 535 (1941).
45. Voeller, 311 U.S. at 535 n.6.
46. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 13-3 (Supp. 1996). The 1976 amend-
ments to the Model Act were adopted in Montana in 1981. See MONT. CODE ANN. §
4151997]
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intended to provide a method for shareholders to receive fair
value for their shares without having to resort to litigation."'
The Principles of Corporate Governance states that the intent of
the appraisal remedy "is to specify the fundamental elements of
an effective appraisal remedy that will reduce litigation, facili-
tate efficiency-promoting transactions, ensure reasonably fair
procedures, and provide a forum in which the focus will appro-
priately be on the central question of fair value, rather than on
collateral issues of motive or purpose.'
The Model Act defines "fair value," but does not state how
value is to be determined.49 Further, the Official Comment to
the Model Act states only:
The definition of fair value in section 13.01(3) leaves to the
parties (and ultimately to the courts) the details by which "fair
value" is to be determined within the broad outlines of the
definition. This definition thus leaves untouched the accumulat-
ed case law about market value, value based on prior sales,
capitalized earnings value, and asset value.'
While the Model Act leaves the method of determination of
fair value to the courts, it sets forth the procedural aspects of
dissenters' rights in great detail. If a corporation proposes an
action that gives rise to dissenters' rights, such as a merger or
adoption of an amendment to the articles of incorporation that
would change fundamental rights of the shareholders, it must
notify the shareholders."' The burden then shifts to the
shareholders to give notice of their intent to exercise the right to
dissent before the vote is taken and to not vote in favor of the
proposal.52 If the proposal is adopted, the corporation must noti-
fy qualifying shareholders within ten days after the corporate
action is taken.53 The notice must comply with the technical
requirements of the Act, including setting a date within thirty to
sixty days by which the shareholder must make a further de-
35-1-812 (1981).
47. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 13-3 (Supp. 1996).
48. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 296.
49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-826(4) (1995) (stating that "fair value,' with
respect to a dissenter's shares, means the value of the shares immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any ap-
preciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion
would be inequitable").
50. 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 13-6 (Supp. 1996).
51. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-829 (1995).
52. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-830 (1995).
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-831 (1995).
[Vol. 58416
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mand for payment. The burden then shifts again to the share-
holder to demand payment and tender the stock certificate with-
in the time specified.' Failure to follow these procedures extin-
guishes the shareholder's right to dissent.5
Fortunately for the dissenter, jumping through these proce-
dural hoops entitles him or her to payment of the "fair value" of
the shares. The corporation is required to pay what it estimates
to be a fair value and to provide its balance sheet, income state-
ment and other information required by law.5" A dissenter may
keep the amount paid and notify the corporation that it does not
represent fair value.57 However, the dissenter is required to
state the minimum amount that he or she is willing to accept
and, if this demand is unreasonable, could be assessed litigation
expenses." Within sixty days after receiving the payment de-
mand, the corporation must commence a proceeding for a judicial
determination of the fair value of the shares59 or pay the dis-
senter the full amount demanded."
A demand for payment by the shareholder triggers the sixty-
day default period, but what if the corporation never gives notice
of dissenters' rights to the shareholder? In McCann Ranch, Inc.
v. Quigley-McCann,6 the majority shareholders voted to convert
the corporation to a statutory close corporation without notifying
the shareholders that this action gave rise to dissenters' rights.
Instead of proceeding under section 35-1-838 of the Montana
Code, the corporation filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment
Act and successfully side-stepped the issue of its default under
the dissenters' rights statute." The minority shareholder ac-
cepted jurisdiction by the district court and stipulated that the
issue was limited to valuation of the shares.' The Montana Su-
preme Court refused to let the shareholder reopen the dissenters'
54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-832 (1995).
55. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-832(3) (1995).
56. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-834 (1995).
57. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-837 (1995).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-839 (1995).
59. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-838 (1995); see also Gold Reserve Corp. v.
McCarty, 228 Mont. 512, 744 P.2d 160 (1987) (excusing an attorney's late signature
on the petition to uphold the policy of favoring adjudication on the merits wherever
possible).
60. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-838(1) (1995); see also Breniman, 829 P.2d 493
(holding that a corporation that failed to file a proceeding within 60 days was
deemed to have waived any objection to dissenter's claim).
61. 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239 (1996).
62. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-829 (1995).
63. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 207, 915 P.2d at 241.
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rights issues on appeal, noting that the shareholder had failed to
institute proceedings to challenge [the corporation's] failure to
notify her of such dissenter's rights.""
Under similar facts in other states, failure by a corporation
to follow the statutory dissenters' rights procedures has resulted
in a full recovery by the shareholder.' In an Idaho case, share-
holders were informed of the corporate action but not of their
right to dissent or to demand payment.6" Their attorney sent a
demand letter reminding the corporation that it was required to
commence an action, but the corporation failed to do so. The
court found that "[bly failing to file a petition, the corporation
defaulted, giving rise to the dissenters' entitlement to payment of
the sum demanded."67 Similarly, in a Colorado case, the court
held that the corporation's failure to act within sixty days effec-
tively waived its right to dispute the amount of the plaintiffs
demand. 8 While the dissenting shareholder may need to com-
mence proceedings, as pointed out by the Montana Supreme
Court,69 the corporation is required to pay the cost of the pro-
ceedings, assuming the court does not find that the "dissenters
acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith in demanding pay-
ment. 70
A further incentive for the corporation to closely follow the
dissenters' rights procedures is that once the rights have been
invoked, the right of the shareholders to commence other pro-
ceedings or to seek to enjoin the corporate action is extin-
guished.7' A shareholder who is entitled to dissent may not
challenge the corporate action in any other way, unless the ac-
tion is unlawful or fraudulent.72 However, because the share-
holder is only excluded from taking action further against the
corporation for the action which gave rise to the dissenters'
rights, the shareholder may still be able to bring an action based
on prior conduct for a breach of fiduciary or other duty.73
64. Id. at 210, 915 P.2d at 242.
65. See, e.g., Breniman, 839 P.2d at 495; Waters v. Double L, Inc., 755 P.2d
1294 (Id. Ct. App. 1987).
66. See Waters, 755 P.2d at 1297.
67. Id. at 1304.
68. See Breniman, 839 P.2d at 495.
69. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 210, 915 P.2d at 242.
70. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-839(1) (1995).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-827(2) (1995).
72. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-827(2) (1995).
73. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02 cmt. 2, and cases cited at §§
13-27 to -32 (Supp. 1996). See also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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B. Judicial Dissolution and Alternative Remedies
While the exercise of dissenters' rights is a no-fault proceed-
ing, actions for judicial dissolution or alternative equitable relief
require findings of some misconduct. The grounds for judicial
dissolution of a conventional corporation are that "the directors
or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or
will act in a manner that is "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent." 4
This includes any misconduct amounting to a breach of fiduciary
duty.75
In Maddox v. Norman,76 the Montana Supreme Court rec-
ognized that a complete dissolution at the request of the owner
of a seven and one-half percent interest in the corporation was
not practical. Instead, the court took the laudable step of creat-
ing an alternative remedy, ordering a compulsory buy-out of the
minority shareholder. The decision was subsequently codified at
section 35-1-939 of the Montana Code.77 Similar provisions ap-
plicable to statutory close corporations authorize a court to order
a compulsory purchase of a petitioner's shares as an alternative
remedy.78 Court-ordered dissolution might be avoided under
section 35-9-503 of the Montana Code if the corporation or one or
more of the shareholders purchases the shares of the complain-
ing shareholder for their fair value. 9
While the degree and measure of culpability that gives rise
74. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938(2Xb) (1995); Maddox v. Norman, 206
Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
75. See, e.g., Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 804
P.2d 359 (1990); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982);
Skierka v. Skierka Bros., 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
76. 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
77. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (1995). This section states:
Discretion of court to grant relief other than dissolution. (1) In any action
fied by a shareholder or director to dissolve the corporation on the grounds
enumerated in 35-1-938, the court may make any order to grant the relief
other than dissolution as, in its discretion, it considers appropriate, includ-
ing, without limitation, an order ...
(d) providing for the purchase at fair value of shares of any share-
holder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders.
(2) Relief under subsection (1) may be granted as an alternative to a decree
of dissolution or may be granted whenever, under the circumstances of the
case, relief but not dissolution would be appropriate.
Id.
78. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-207(2Xa) (1995) (stating that "[tihe court shall
determine the fair value of the shares subject to compulsory purchase in accordance
with the standards set forth in section 35-9-503, together with terms for the pur-
chase").
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-503(1) (1995).
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to a court-ordered repurchase of minority shares may differ, the
statutes and case law all require that the price reflect fair val-
ue.' Section 35-9-503 of the Montana Code contains a compre-
hensive statutory listing of factors to be considered in determin-
ing fair value:
(i) the going concern value of the corporation;
(ii) any agreement among some or all of the shareholders fixing
the price or specifying a formula for determining share value
for any purpose;
(iii) the recommendations of appraisers, if any, appointed by
the court; and
(iv) any legal constraints on the corporation's ability to pur-
chase the shares."s
This list seemingly supports the view that the parties should
consider all shares to be of equal value rather than discount
certain shares to reflect minority status or lack of marketability.
C. Majority View of Fair Value
Given free reign to interpret the dissenters' rights and disso-
lution statutes, courts have split on the question of whether
discounts should be taken into account in determining the fair
value of shares in closely-held corporations. Three basic ap-
proaches have evolved: (1) no discounts should be taken to reflect
either the minority status or the lack of a public market; (2) a
discount for minority status is inappropriate, but a discount for
lack of marketability is allowable; or (3) discounts for both mi-
nority status and for lack of marketability are appropriate.
A majority of the courts conclude that no discounts should be
taken in determining fair value, reasoning that for most purpos-
es the enterprise should be valued as an entity and any dis-
counts should be taken at the enterprise level.8 2 The market
80. Professor BahIs advocated flexible application of a "reasonable expectations"
test to measure oppression, separate from the duties of care and loyalty. See Bahis,
supra note 1, at 16-22. Another commentator suggested that dissolution-at-will is an
effective self-policing mechanism. See Scot Schermerhorn, Efficiency vs. Equity in
Close Corporations, 52 MONT. L. REV. 73, 87 (1991).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-503(2Xa) (1995).
82. See, e.g., Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Minneso-
ta law); Brown v. Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 173-76 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A-2d 1137 (Del. 1989); Woodward v.
Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1965); Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes,
562 N.E.2d 662, 667-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that fair market value is not the
appropriate measure of fair value where dissenting minority shareholder is bought
420 [Vol. 58
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value of the enterprise should already be determined, and pro-
viding for further discounts at the shareholder level is inherently
unfair to the minority who did not pick the timing of the
transaction and is not in the position of a willing seller. Because
the shares are being purchased by the corporation rather than
being sold into a market, the case law rejects the assumption
that fair value means fair market value. Accordingly, the value
of the shares is their value to the corporation. "Any rule of law
that gave the shareholders less than their proportionate share of
the whole firm's fair value would produce a transfer of wealth
from the minority shareholders to the shareholders in control.
Such a rule would inevitably encourage corporate squeeze-
outs."'
In its leading opinion in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,"4 the
Delaware Supreme Court stated the reasoning behind the major-
ity view in the form of a fairly tidy syllogism: the first premise is
that appraisals require the company to be viewed as an ongoing
concern; the second premise is that the shareholders would be
willing to maintain their investment position in the company;
and the conclusion is that dissenting shareholders should be put
in as equivalent a position had the merger not occurred.' To
effect this equivalency of position, the court rejected a market
value discount as an effort to reconstruct a pro forma sale, which
was not appropriate due to the shareholder's assumed willing-
ness to continue his investment. The court also rejected a dis-
count for lack of control to avoid allowing the majority to reap a
windfall. The court noted that the objective of a dissenters' rights
statute is "to value the corporation itself, as distinguished from a
specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a
particular shareholder.' By so ruling, the Delaware Supreme
Court applied to a merger of closely-held corporations the
"proportionate share of the enterprise value" test adopted by the
same court in 1983 in the context of a merger of two publicly-
held companies." While appraisers are instructed to consider
out by majority shareholder); In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989); BNE
Mass. Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); MT Properties, Inc. v.
CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Rigel Corp. v.
Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519 (Neb. 1994); Woolf v. Universal Fidelity Life Ins., 849 P.2d
1093 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(applying dissenters' rights law to a contractual settlement).
83. McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d at 1005.
84. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
85. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A-2d at 1145.
86. Id. at 1144.
87. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701. In that case, the court stated:
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all factors that could be used to fix a value for the enterprise as
a whole, no discounts to such value are to be considered at the
shareholder level.
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance adopt the posi-
tion of the majority of state courts and of many commentators,8
stating that the fair value of shares "should be the value of the
eligible holder's... proportionate interest in the corporation,
without any discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary
circumstances, lack of marketability." 9 The ALI statement of
fair value is substantially the same as the rule stated in the
Uniform Partnership Act for determining the value of a partner-
ship interest. This lends substance to the policy of treating
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stock-
holder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz.,
his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or in-
trinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determin-
ing what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and
the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which
might reasonably enter into the fixing of value.
Id. at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)).
88. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bamonte, Measuring Stock Value in Appraisals Under
the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 80 ILL. B.J. 236 (1992); Bahls, supra note 1, at
32 (stating that "[sihareholders whose shares are purchased should not be forced to
sacrifice any element of value representing the going concern value of the firm");
Robert B. Heglar, Note, Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J. 259; Charles
W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its
Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (1990). The
ALI standard was followed in an appraisal action involving a publicly-held company
in Spinnaker Software Corp. v. Nicholson, 495 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
89. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at § 7.22. Valua-
tion is a cornerstone of the appraisal process, particularly in view of the exclusivity
clause. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-619 (1995). "This preference for exclusivity is,
however, premised on the availability of an appraisal remedy with the fundamental
characteristics specified in §§ 7.21-7.23, which gives dissenting shareholders a fair
and effective recourse." 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at
296.
90. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-619(2) (1995) which states:
(a) The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that
would have been distributable to the dissociating partner under 35-10-629(2)
if on the date of dissociation the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of:
(i) the liquidation value; or
(ii) the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going
concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership were
wound up as of that date.
(b) In either case, the selling price of the partnership assets must be deter-
mined on the basis of the amount that would be paid by a willing buyer to
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and
with knowledge of all relevant facts.
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shareholders in a close corporation as partners.9
In 1994, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the post-
Cavalier Oil cases in other jurisdictions at length and concluded
that "[tihe real objective is to ascertain the actual worth of that
which the dissenter loses because of his unwillingness to go
along with the controlling stockholder, that is to indemnify
him."92 To uphold Nebraska's statutory policy of fully compen-
sating minority shareholders, the court held that no minority
discount or deduction for lack of marketability should be giv-
en.
93
Cases addressing fair value in the context of judicial dissolu-
tion or alternative remedy statutes generally follow the majority
view expressed in the more frequently litigated dissenters' rights
cases.9 Because dissolution cases require the minority share-
holder to show some degree of culpability by majority sharehold-
ers, the conduct is often such that should not be rewarded by
allowing a discount.
D. Minority View-Allowing Discounts
Cases allowing discretionary discounts for both minority
status and marketability interpret fair value to mean fair mar-
ket value.95 Accordingly, these courts hold that for purposes of
dissenters' rights statutes, stock may be valued in the same
manner as in other valuations involving a hypothetical arms-
length sale, such as for tax, marital dissolution, or estate purpos-
91. See, e.g., Fox, 198 Mont. at 212-13, 645 P.2d at 935; see generally 1 PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 199.
92. See Rigel Corp., 511 N.W.2d at 524 (citing Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co.,
154 A.2d 796, 799 (Md. 1959)).
93. See Rigel Corp., 511 N.W.2d at 526 (stating that "in the event of a merger,
neither a minority discount nor a deduction for lack of marketability is to be given
in determining the fair value of a dissenter's shares.... Only by not doing so can
the statutory policy of fully compensating a dissenting minority shareholder be
achieved").
94. See Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Lab., Inc., 972 F.2d 799 (7th Cir.
1992) (applying Illinois law to a settlement agreement which stated that the majority
shareholders would purchase the minority shareholder's shares); Charland v. Country
View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991); Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289. But see
McCauley v. McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing
minority discount despite argument that it would allow defendants to benefit from
their own wrongdoing); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985), app. den., 484 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y. 1985) (allowing a marketability
discount but not a minority discount).
95. See, e.g., Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ind. 1983);
Atlantic States Const., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Moore v.
New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167 (Kan. 1981).
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es.96 This line of cases contains little analysis, but appeals
somewhat to common sense. In a decision applying Indiana law,
the federal district court justified a discount as customary and
necessary because the minority could not force a liquidation or
dividend nor could it dictate or control corporate policy.97 Such
emphasis on the element of control is itself problematic, particu-
larly in cases involving close corporations. In these cases, the
expense and uncertainty of litigation may create a potential for
the controlling shareholders to breach their fiduciary duties.98
Those cases that allow a marketability discount while disal-
lowing a minority discount are somewhat contradictory.99 The
court will not allow a minority discount because it would cause
the majority to reap a windfall or profit at the expense of the
minority; however, by allowing a discount for lack of market-
ability, the court is allowing just such a windfall. The majority
shareholders are able to acquire or have the corporation buy
stock at a discount from the proportionate share of the enter-
prise, thereby increasing the value of the remaining shares.
In Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss," the Oregon Court
of Appeals allowed a marketability discount because the discount
applied to both the majority and minority shares."0 ° In that
case, the appraisal experts first determined that the enterprise
value of the successful financial services company was $50 mil-
lion-more than seven times its book value. The minority
shareholder's fourteen percent proportionate share was $7.185
million. The appraisers then applied successive thirty-three per-
cent discounts, first for minority status, and then for lack of
marketability, concluding that fair value of the shares was
$3.196 million or forty-four percent of the proportionate share of
enterprise value.
While agreeing with the trial judge's acceptance of the $50
96. See Breniman, 829 P.2d 493 (stating, in dicta, that by failing to commence
a proceeding within the statutory 60-day period, the corporation had waived the right
to object to the dissenters' price demand); McCauley, 724 P.2d 232 (holding that a
25% discount was appropriate to reflect minority and marketability factors).
97. See Perlman, 568 F. Supp. at 226; see also Moore, 630 P.2d 167 (similarly
stressing the importance of control).
98. See Heglar, supra note 88, at 274.
99. See Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982); Blake, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (decreasing discount from 40% to 25% to reflect
only a marketability discount and not minority interest discount); Columbia Mgmt.
Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
100. 765 P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
101" See Columbia Management Co., 765 P.2d at 214 (citing Blake, 486 N.Y.S.2d
at 341).
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million enterprise value, the appellate court noted that the busi-
ness was less stable than other less volatile businesses because
clients and employees could leave at any time.1 2 The court rea-
soned that this volatility would "make the shares unmarketable
if the price were simply their proportionate share of the enter-
prise value."" The court concluded that "[t]he marketability
discount... sufficiently reflects the difference between the
shares' proportion of the enterprise value and their fair val-
ue"104 and applied a marketability discount to the shares in-
stead of to the enterprise as a whole, apparently disagreeing
with the appraisers generous valuation of the enterprise.
While Montana's courts generally look to Oregon decisions
for guidance, Columbia Management should not be followed. The
Oregon court may have reached a proper result for the wrong
reasons. If the appraisers had applied a more substantial dis-
count at the enterprise level to reflect the risks of the business,
the court may not have been inclined to apply a further discount
at the shareholder level to reflect essentially the same risk fac-
tors. In light of its apparent discomfort with the valuations of
the appraisers, the court should have remanded for further pro-
ceedings, rather than accept the appraisals and distort the legal
analysis to fit the needs of the case.
E. Fair Value in Montana
In McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann,°5 the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that a discount was appropriate in de-
termining the fair value of a minority interest in a close corpora-
tion, reasoning that minority shares are simply worth less than
control stock."° In that case, the corporation initiated the ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment of the fair value of the stock."°7
The action was not brought under the dissenters' rights stat-
ute"~ or for relief from oppression under the statutory close
102. See Columbia Mgmt Co., 765 P.2d at 212-13.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 214.
105. 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239 (1996).
106. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 210-11, 915 P.2d at 242-43; see also
Humphreys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1956) (relating a story told to
the Ohio State Bar Association by its president, John H. Doyle, in which a promi-
nent Eastern newspaperman, in response to the question of what the shares of his
company were worth, replied, "There are 51 shares that are worth $250,000. There
are 49 shares that are not worth a -. "
107. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 207, 915 P.2d at 241.
108. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-838 (1995). The minority shareholder asserted
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corporation statute,"° and the parties stipulated that the only
issue was a judicial declaration of the fair value of the stock." °
In theory, the court's holding may have been correct and was
consistent with a prior Montana case that held that in determin-
ing the measure of damages for breach of contract, the term
"value" standing alone means "market value.""' At most,
McCann Ranch should be considered an application of contract
law to the interpretation of the terms of the particular agree-
ment, not as an application of corporate law to determine the
fair value of stock. Further, the trial court and the Montana
Supreme Court may have felt constrained by the fact that the
appraisal experts for both sides viewed the minority discounts as
appropriate."' However, valuation experts are trained primari-
ly to respond to tax-driven gift or estate tax situations in which
a conservatively low valuation is highly desirable from the per-
spective of the potential taxpayers and, presumably, an accept-
able result from the point of view of the IRS as well."'
Courts in other jurisdictions that have construed stipula-
tions or settlement agreements between the parties to a share-
holder dispute have not reached consistent results. Rather, the
outcome largely depends upon whether the court considered the
corporate context in which the cases arose. In a corporate con-
text, some element of coercion by the majority often compels the
minority shareholder to seek liquidation of the investment at a
particular time. Additionally, because the buyer in the corporate
context is either the corporation or the majority shareholders,
concerns about the shares not being "control stock" or not being
marketable are not properly part of the equation for establishing
rights as a dissenting shareholder for the first time in her post-trial brief. Brief of
Respondent at 29, McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann, 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d
239 (1996) (No. 95-416).
109. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501 (1995).
110. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 207, 915 P.2d at 241.
111. See Orford v. Topp, 136 Mont. 227, 231, 346 P.2d 566 (1959).
112. See Brief of Respondent at 11-12, McCann Ranch, Inc. (No. 95-416); see also
Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927, 931 (IlM. 1988) (supporting mi-
nority discounts in cases in which both sides employed an expert). Illinois subse-
quently rejected the view that fair value means fair market value. See Institutional
Equip. & Interiors, Inc., 562 N.E.2d at 667-68 (holding that fair market value is not
an appropriate measure of fair value in cases in which a dissenting minority share-
holder is bought out by a majority shareholder).
113. See generally Harry J. Haynsworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33
MERCER L. REv. 457 (1982) (citing Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959 C.B. 237, as the "most
complete statement of the relevant factors to consider in valuing a closely held busi-
ness").
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value.114 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
facts in their corporate context and held that no minority dis-
count should have been applied where the majority shareholder
agreed to buy out the minority shareholder at fair value, reject-
ing the argument that fair value is synonymous with fair market
value." The court noted that a minority discount should be
applied if the shares are being sold to a third party, but not
when the majority shareholder is the purchaser."6
The Montana cases that the court relied upon in McCann
Ranch had no necessary relationship to corporate law principles,
but rather arose in marital dissolution proceedings." 7 In cases
in which the court allowed a minority interest discount, the
transactions, i.e., an inter-spousal settlement of relative values,
did not involve a sale from a minority shareholder to a control-
ling shareholder or to the corporation."' Rather, the transac-
tion involved a transfer from one minority shareholder to anoth-
er. On the other hand, even in marital dissolution cases in which
the purchaser is the corporation or part of a group that controls
the corporation, neither the Montana Supreme Court nor the dis-
trict courts has allowed minority discounts."9 These results are
consistent with Cavalier Oil and other state court decisions that
hold that discounts are not appropriate in dissenters' rights or
114. See, e.g., Charland, 588 A.2d at 612 (stating that "when a corporation elects
to buy out the shares of a dissenting shareholder, the fact that the shares are
noncontrolling is irrelevant").
115. See Laserage Tech. Corp., 972 F.2d at 805.
116. See id. Similarly, a Washington state court held that in dividing assets pur-
suant to a letter agreement, a minority fair market value discount should not have
been applied and examined the issue as though the appraisal rights statute applied.
See Robblee, 841 P.2d at 1289. However, an Indiana case held that an agreed entry
between shareholders directing the court to consider any and all issues that relate to
determination of price did not warrant deviation from fair market valuation. See
Battershall v. Prestwick Sales, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
117. See, e.g., In re Milesnick, 235 Mont. 88, 765 P.2d 751 (1988); In re
Jorgensen, 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606 (1979).
118. See In re Milesnick, 235 Mont. 88, 765 P.2d 751 (finding that a discount is
appropriate where a husband and wife together owned 10% of a ranching corporation
(received as gifts from the husband's parents) because neither the husband nor the
wife were part of the control group.); In re Jorgensen, 180 Mont. at 300, 590 P.2d at
610 (valuing minority stock pursuant to shareholders' agreement).
119. See In re Johnston, 223 Mont. 383, 387, 726 P.2d 322 (1986) (stating that
this is not "a situation where a discount would accurately reflect a minority
shareholder's lack of ability to control salaries, dividends or other corporate benefits."
In other words, because of the family relationships the shares were really part of a
control group and not truly minority shares); Buxbaum v. Buxbaumo, 214 Mont. 1,
692 P.2d 411 (1984) (stating that "[t]his is not a situation where the minority stock
should be discountd.... In this case the value of the corporation was arrived at
by the market value of the underlying assets.").
21
Oitzinger: Fair Price and Fair Play
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
dissolution cases in which the corporation or a controlling share-
holder is the buyer.120 The court in McCann Ranch erred in not
focusing on the critical factual distinction: that the corporation
itself was the purchaser of the shares.1
21
When faced with deciding the propriety of minority dis-
counts, the Montana Supreme Court should take a careful and
considered look at the determination of fair value under the
dissenters' rights and judicial dissolution statutes.2 2 In the
meantime, practitioners may want to advise clients that the only
sure way to avoid the minority issue discount in Montana is
through an appropriately-worded shareholders' agreement.'
Attorneys representing the corporation and/or the controlling
shareholders should keep in mind the difficult conflict of interest
issues that can arise.' If the majority shareholders are not
120. See, e.g., In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d at 1004 (stating that "methods
used in valuing stock for tax, probate, ERISA, and like purposes in which market
value is the essence are inappropriate to the determination of the fair value owed to
dissenting shareholders").
121. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 207, 915 P.2d at 241.
122. The Montana Supreme Court has not considered the valuation of minority
shares. But see Maddox, 206 Mont. at 17, 669 P.2d at 238. There, the Montana Su-
preme Court rejected a district court decision valuing the shares of a minority share-
holder by reference to a purchase by the corporation of shares from another minority
shareholder. The court stated that the issue was whether the transaction was an
arms-length transaction because the other minority shareholder was a party to the
litigation. Because the case was remanded, the court did not reach the further ques-
tion of whether a minority discount would have been appropriate.
123. See, e.g., 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 10.50 (3rd ed. 1996). The authors suggested such a provision:
The parties further agree that in any appraisal or valuation of shares of
this company, whether in the purchase of a shareholder's stock in the cor-
poration under a buy-and-sell agreement or stock-purchase agreement, in an
appraisal proceeding under a dissenter's rights statute, in a judicially or-
dered purchase of a shareholder's interest, in a valuation of shares of a
holder who petitions for involuntary dissolution and the corporation or the
other shareholders assert a statutory right to buy out the petitioner, or
otherwise, each share of stock in this corporation shall be treated as of
equal value to every other share in the corporation, and that a minority
interest in the corporation shall not be discounted for purposes of transfer
to the corporation, a successor to the corporation or the other shareholders
either because the interest does not control the corporation (lack of control)
or because the interest is lacking in marketability.
Id.
124. Cf Skierka, 192 Mont. 509, 629 P.2d 214; see also OINEAL AND THOMPSON,
supra note 123, § 2.02, at 2-2. The authors stated:
When an attorney is asked to represent prospective shareholders (if more
than one) in organizing a close corporation, or when the attorney is later
asked to represent all the shareholders in preparing a shareholders' agree-
ment or any other document affecting corporate control or the transfer of
shares, he should discuss with them possible conflicts of interests and let
22
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inclined to treat the minority shareholders equally, the Rules of
Professional Conduct may preclude representation of both par-
ties.'
IV. FAIR PLAY
Claims for breaches of fiduciary duty by directors, officers,
and majority shareholders are present in many actions for ap-
praisal rights,"e dissolution, and court-ordered buy-out' as
well as in derivative actions, which are the primary vehicle for
challenging breaches of fiduciary duty.1" The standard for de-
termining acts of oppression or those that violate a shareholder's
reasonable expectations is highly flexible but difficult to define,
leading to inconsistent results.'2 Courts may be reluctant to
each participant decide if he wants the attorney to serve, which for mone-
tary or other reasons is the usual response, the attorney must be partic-
ularly careful to point out to them the advantages and disadvantages to
each in the various courses of action.
Id. § 2.02, at 2-2.
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (stating that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client, unless . . . the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client . . . " and each
client consents); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(e).
126. See, e.g., Laserage Technology Corp. v. Laserage Laboratories, Inc., 972 F.2d
799 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting a settlement agreement resolving claims for breach
of fiduciary duties).
127. See, e.g., Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I.
1991) (involving a petition for dissolution on grounds of illegal activities by an offi-
cer); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
128. A number of interesting decisions have come out of other jurisdictions from
cases in which a derivative claim was combined with appraisal claims. For example,
in Breniman v. Agricultural Consultants, Inc., 829 P.2d 493 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), a
shareholder brought an action asserting derivative claims as well as claims for an
appraisal. The court dismissed the derivative claims, reasoning that once the share-
holder tendered his stock to the corporation he was no longer a shareholder and had
no standing to pursue the derivative claims. See id. at 497. Also, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that damages for breaches of fiduciary duty could be included
as assets in the valuation process under the dissenters' rights claim. See Fay, 992
F.2d at 780 (applying Minnesota law).
The Delaware courts have struggled with the issue in light of an earlier case
that held that a separate action must be maintained where there are allegations of
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a merger. See Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor Inc., 542 A.2d 1188 (Del. 1988). The Cede & Co. decision was distin-
guished in Cavalier Oil Corp., in which the court considered corporate opportunity
claims that related directly to the value of the stock in an appraisal action as one of
the elements in determining value. See Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1143; see also
In re Radiology Assoc., Inc. Lit., 611 A-2d 485, 501 (Del. Ch. 1991).
129. See OEAL AND THOMPSON, supra note 123, § 9.30, at 9-141 (stating that
'oppression and other similar terms in the statutes provide broad amorphous grounds
for relief which cannot be defined with precision in advance without destroying their
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extend the "reasonable expectations" standard due to the diffi-
culties with the subjective nature of the proof, the remoteness in
time of the events being tested and the prospect of conflicting
"expectations" where there are more than two or three share-
holders. 30 Proof of a breach of fiduciary duty would normally
focus on a recent event giving rise to the cause of action and
would be more objectively verifiable. Fiduciary duties are also
more commonly understood and, thus, are applied more consis-
tently. While certain acts of oppression disappoint the expecta-
tions of a minority shareholder, such as refusing to include them
in management or elect them to the board, they may not amount
to a breach of duty; however, all breaches of duty are oppressive.
Moreover, whether a single breach of duty is sufficient to justify
relief depends on the circumstances; however, if it occurs in
conjunction with other oppressive conduct, even conduct that
does not amount to a breach of duty, a court may still be inclined
to grant relief.
A. Statutory Standards of Conduct
The Montana Business Corporation Act expresses the stan-
dards of conduct for directors as follows:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including the
director's duties as a member of a committee:
(a) in good faith;
(b) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a similar
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation." 1
The same standards apply to corporate officers. 32 Directors
and officers are entitled to rely broadly on information and re-
utility in new and unforeseen situations").
130. See Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Ma-
jority Shareholders Exclude A Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Pur-
pose?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227, 233 (1993).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-418(1) (1995). This provision was preceded by, and
is similar to, section 35-1-401(2) of the Montana Code which states: "A director shall
perform his duties ... in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-401(2) (repealed 1991).
132. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-443(1) (1995). This provision is applicable to
officers with "discretionary authority," a term that is not defined in the statute, but
one which should not be difficult to interpret.
430 [Vol. 58
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ports furnished by others; however, an officer or director is not
acting in good faith if he has knowledge that makes such reli-
ance unwarranted.1" A director or officer who performs his du-
ties in compliance with the statutory standards is not liable for
any action taken as a director or officer.13
While courts and commentators alike continue to speak in
terms of the fiduciary duties of directors and officers, neither the
current Montana Business Corporation Act nor its predecessor
uses the term "fiduciary" to describe the duties of directors.1"
The Model Act uses the term "standard" in place of "duty." The
Official Comment to the Model Act explains this shift by distin-
guishing the standards applicable to directors and officers from
the fiduciary duties arising under the law of trusts."3 The
Principles of Corporate Governance refers to "duties" or "duty of
care standards" and notes:
Directors, officers and other persons who control corporations
have fiduciary duties that are not necessarily the same as those
owed by trustees. In closely held corporations, however, such
persons may be deemed to have a relationship similar to that of
partners, with duties analogous to those stemming from that
relationship. 7
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-418(2), -443(2) (1995). Apparently, the move-
ment toward gender neutrality in statutory terminology has yet to reach the business
corporation act.
134. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-418(4), -443(4) (1995); see also MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.42 Off. Cmt. This comment states:
This section provides that a nondirector officer with discretionary authority
must meet the same standards of conduct required of directors under sec-
tion 8.30. But his ability to rely on information reports, or statements, may,
depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, be more limited
than in the case of a director in view of the greater obligation he may have
to be familiar with the affairs of the corporation.
Id.
135. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-418(2) (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401(2)
(repealed 1991).
136. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 Off. Cmt. (stating that the term "fidu-
ciary duty.., could be confused with the unique attributes and obligations of a
fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which are not appropriate for direc-
tors of a corporation"). In one of the leading Montana cases favoring the rights of
minority shareholders in the face of "oppression," the majority shareholders were
subject to fiduciary duties under trust law as well as corporate law. See Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
137. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 199. The Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance states:
To avoid confusion about terminology, the word 'function' is used herein to
include the powers exercised by, and to delineate the corporate tasks that
are to be performed by, a corporate body (e.g., the board of directors) or by
an individual (e.g., a director). Courts have often used the word "duty" to
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Notwithstanding the shift in statutory terminology, the expres-
sion "fiduciary duty" is so ingrained in our corporate lexicon that
it continues to be used by courts and commentators without any
suggestion that a change in meaning is in order."
B. Common Law Duties and the Principles of Corporate
Governance
The brief statutory statements of standards of conduct give
rise to the massive body of law defining and refining the fiducia-
ry duties owed by directors and officers to their corporations or,
in the case of controlling shareholders, both to the corporation
and to minority shareholders. Most analysts describe these du-
ties in terms of a duty of care to which the business judgment
rule applies,"3 9 and a duty of loyalty or fair dealing to which
the business judgment rule does not apply." Courts sometimes
refer to other corollaries to these duties, such as a duty not to
seize corporate opportunities,' a duty not to compete with the
corporation," a duty of disclosure," and even- a duty to pay
attention.'"
refer to these powers and tasks as well as to the standard of care under
which the performance of a director or officer is to be judged. As used here-
in, however, the words "duty" and "duty of care" refer solely to the obliga-
tion of all corporate directors and officers to perform their functions in the
manner set forth in Parts IV-VI.
Id. at 145.
138. See, e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 10.
139. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 4.01; BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 10, at 52-108.
140. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at Part V.
After stating the general principle in section 5.01 that directors, officers, and con-
trolling shareholders are under a duty of fair dealing that includes an obligation of
appropriate disclosure, separate sections in Part V deal with transactions with the
corporation (§ 5.02); compensation (§ 5.03); use of corporate property (§ 5.04); cor-
porate opportunities (§ 5.05); competition with the corporation (§ 5.06); and transac-
tions between corporations with common directors or officers (§ 5.08); see also, BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 10, at 124-51.
141. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.05; BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 10, at 138-145.
142. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.06; BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 10, at 138.
143. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §§ 5.02, 5.10;
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 197-215.
144. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty
of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1492 (1984). The duty to pay
attention was offered as an alternative to the duty of care and the business judg-
ment rule.
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In broad terms, the duty of care is breached by "neglect,
mismanagement, and intentional decisions to do wrongful
acts,""4 and the duty of fair dealing is breached by "fraud, self-
dealing, misappropriation of corporate opportunities, improper
diversions of corporate assets, and similar matters involving
potential conflicts between a director's or officer's interest and
the corporation's welfare. ... "' The distinction between
breaches of the duty of care on one hand and breaches of the
duty not to self-deal or otherwise deal unfairly on the other has
been said to be "fundamental to ... the preservation of state
corporate law."147
Determining when a person has a conflicting interest is the
touchstone of assessing responsibility for breaches of corporate
duties. The presence or absence of a conflict determines whether
the duty of care (and the business judgment rule) or the duty of
fair dealing applies."4 As one study pointed out, a court's
choice of standard to apply is often dispositive of the litiga-
tion. 49 Under the business judgment rule standard of review,
"the plaintiff bears the burden to establish each element of the
claim he asserts ... by a preponderance of credible evi-
dence.""s But, under the fairness standard, "it is the defendant
who is called upon to establish that the transaction attacked was
on terms entirely fair to the corporation or, in some circum-
stances, to the corporation's shareholders." 5'
1. Duty of Care and The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is an integral part of the duty of
care. 52 The traditional justification for the business judgment
145. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 137.
146. Id.
147. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-78 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982).
148. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 137; cf Part
IV (Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule) and Part V (Duty of Fair Deal-
ing). 'These rules [Part V] reflect the underlying obligation of [a director, officer or
controlling shareholder] when interested in a matter affecting the corporation, to act
fairly toward the corporation and its shareholders." Id. at 199.
149. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 16-17.
150. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch. 1991) quoted
in BLOCK ST AL., supra note 10, at 16.
151. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 16.
152. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 4.01. This
section states:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she
1997] 433
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rule is that it ensures that directors and corporate managers are
free to take risks in the ordinary conduct of business that may
turn out to be unwise or the result of a mistake of judgment."5
The Official Comment to section 8.30 of the Model Act states
that "a director is not liable for injury or damage caused by his
decision, no matter how unwise or mistaken it may turn out to
be, if in performing his duties he met the requirements" of the
statutory standard of conduct. After an initial effort to codify the
business judgment rule, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
ultimately concluded that the matter should be decided by the
courts.' 5 ' The commentary to the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance states candidly that the business judgment rule is
"based on a desire to limit litigation and judicial intrusiveness
with respect to private-sector business decisionmaking."' To
accomplish this goal, the ALI reporters removed any remnants of
an ordinary negligence standard of reasonable care from the
business judgment standard:
Courts have generally recognized the difficulties inherent in
making post hoc judgments about the duty of care exercised by
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. This Subsection
(a) is subject to the provisions of Subsection (c) (the business judgment
rule) where applicable ....
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith ful-
fills the duty under this Section if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested . . . in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judg-
ment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be
appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation [cross references omitted].
Id. at § 4.01. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-418 (1995) with 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.3.
153. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 135. This
section states:
The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is that cor-
porate law should encourage, and afford broad protection to, informed busi-
ness judgments (whether subsequent events prove the judgments right or
wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking, innovation, and other creative
entrepreneurial activities. Shareholders accept the risk that an informed
business decision-honestly undertaken and rationally believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation-may not be vindicated by subsequent
success.
Id.
154. See E. Norman Veasey, New Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors'
Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAW 1461 (1984).
155. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 135.
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directors and officers and have allowed them considerable lee-
way. Since the turn. of the century there have been only about
40 or so cases reflected in appellate opinions-most of them
involving egregious facts--where directors or officers have been
found to have violated the duty of care obligations."
A 1968 study by Professor Bishop found only four cases in
which directors of industrial, i.e., non-financial, corporations
were held potentially liable for negligence, uncomplicated by self-
dealing.1 7 Courts may excuse even egregious conduct if the cor-
poration has amended its articles of incorporation to eliminate
liability of directors (but not officers or controlling shareholders)
for conduct that is not criminal or an intentional infliction of
harm to the corporation.' In so doing, corporate directors can
avoid liability for all unintentional, and even some intentional,
wrongdoing.
The center of debate at present is whether and to what de-
gree director inaction or inattentiveness constitutes a breach of
the duty of care. 9 Under the ALI Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance, directors must inquire only when the circumstances
would alert a reasonable director to the need for inquiry."w
However, the comment to section 4.01 of the Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance goes further and suggests the need for a cor-
porate law compliance program." The need for compliance pro-
grams has gained new urgency following a recent decision of the
Delaware Chancery Court which suggested that "a director's obli-
156. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 155.
157. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 160 n.17
(citing Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the In-
demnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-100
(1968)). The reporters also cite cases decided since 1968 but concede that some of the
cases with egregious facts had "duty of loyalty overtones." 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 160 n.17.
158. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2) (1995); supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
159. See Dominic Bencivenga, Words of Warning-Ruling Makes Directors Ac-
countable for Compliance, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1997; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M.
Hoff, Duty of 'Caremark: Directors Oversight Function, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1996; Ed-
ward Brodsky, Directors' Liability-Importance of Compliance Procedures, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 13, 1997; Edward P. Welch & Andrew J. Turezyn, The Del. Court of Chancery
Rules on a Board's Duty to Monitor Employees; the Legislature Amends the State's
Business Laws, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B5.
160. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 4.01(aXl); see
also, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Cor-
porate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
161. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 4.01 cmt. c.
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gation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system... exists, and that
failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at
least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compli-
ance with applicable legal standards."'62
In re Caremark"6 arose out of the 1994 indictment of
Caremark International, Inc., a provider of managed health care
services, two of its officers, and several mid-level employees for
violations of federal health care reimbursement regulations
which prohibited health care providers from paying any form of
renumeration to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid
patients. A derivative suit was filed on behalf of Caremark alleg-
ing that the directors breached their duty of care by failing to
monitor activities of the company's employees, thereby exposing
the corporation to substantial fines and liability.'6 After a
four-year investigation by the federal authorities and while the
derivative suit was pending, Caremark pleaded guilty to one
count of felony mail fraud and agreed to pay civil and criminal
fines and reimbursements amounting to $250 million."8 No di-
rectors or senior officers were charged with wrongdoing in either
the indictment or the government settlement agreements."s
The Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the fairness of a
negotiated settlement agreement of the derivative action in
which Caremark and its directors agreed to establish a new
compliance program and ethics committee.'67 The only cash
payment that the settlement required the defendants to make
was the payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees." In approving
the settlement, the court considered that it was unlikely that the
directors could be found to have breached the duty of care be-
cause they had been advised by attorneys that the questioned
conduct was lawful and because they had in place a corporate
information and reporting system.69
Most public corporations have adopted compliance proce-
dures for a variety of reasons, including potentially lower fines
or penalties under the federal Organizational Sentencing Guide-
162. In re Caremark Intl Inc., Civ. A. No. 13670, 1996 WL 549894, at *11 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 25, 1996).
163. Civ. A. No. 13670, 1996 WL 549894, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1996).
164. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 1996 WL 549894, at *5.
165. See id. at *1.
166. See id. at *6.
167. See id. at *7.
168. See id. at *13.
169. See id. at *12-13.
[Vol. 58436
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lines adopted in 1991.170 These guidelines offer, among other
things, reduced sanctions when a corporation has implemented a
suitable compliance program. Such programs have become so
common that a company with no program, or one that exists only
on paper, is vulnerable to a claim that its directors were not
acting in good faith.17 ' Larger and more complex close corpora-
tions should also be encouraged to adopt compliance programs or
to review existing programs if they operate in an area in which
violations of law by employees could arise.
2. Duty of Fair Dealing
Under traditional fiduciary principles borrowed from trust
law, a transaction with an interested fiduciary is either void or
voidable, regardless of the fairness of the transaction to the cor-
poration. 171 Parties operating in the "real business world" per-
ceived this rule to be unworkable, and new statutory provisions
were adopted that create procedures to salvage transactions
between directors and their corporations while protecting corpo-
rations and their shareholders from unfair dealing.'73
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance state that a
director who is interested in a transaction cannot fulfill the duty
of care even if he or she is acting honestly or in good faith if the
transaction is not fair to the corporation.7 " However, the duty
of fair dealing applies only to directors, officers, and sharehold-
ers who have an interest that conflicts in a particular
transaction. 75 Disinterested directors who approve a transac-
tion in which another director is interested are governed by the
duty of care, including the business judgment rule, but not by
the duty of fair dealing. 76 However, the interested director is
governed by both duties.
In the absence of approval by disinterested directors or
shareholders, the sole criteria for determining whether a breach
170. See Brodsky, supra note 159. See generally, JED. S. RAKOFF ET. AL., COR-
PORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND MITIGATION § 5.02 (1996) (citing a
survey by the Ethics Resource Center finding that 85% of 711 respondents had
adopted a code of conduct or ethics statement); LOUIS M. BROWN & ANNE 0.
KANDEL, THE LEGAL AUDIT: CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION, Ch. 7 (Supp. 1996).
171. See Brodsky, supra note 159.
172. 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. at 8-385.
173. See id.
174. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 4.01(c).
175. See id. § 5.01.
176. See id. at 199.
1997]
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of the duty of fair dealing has occurred is the entire fairness of
the transaction.'77 In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court stat-
ed:
There is no safe harbor for such divided loyalties in Delaware.
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a
transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bar-
gain .... The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its
demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction,
he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. 78
The term "duty of fair dealing" is used instead of the more tradi-
tional term "duty of loyalty" because, under the new statutory
framework, conflicting interest transactions apply primarily, if
not exclusively, to persons acting with a pecuniary interest in a
matter. The Model Act does not address other types of conflicts
of interest; however, the reporters of the Principles of Corporate
Governance expressed the hope that other types of conflict will
be dealt with by the courts should they arise.179
In addition to self-dealing transactions, directors and officers
are broadly prohibited from using their corporate positions for
personal gain. Section 5.04 of the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance states that a director or officer may not use corpo-
rate position to secure a pecuniary benefit, except as permitted
by the stated exceptions. 1" The exceptions include compensa-
tion and benefits made proportionately available to all other
shareholders.' 8' Unlike self-dealing transactions, the initial
burden of proof for misuse of corporate position is on the person
challenging the conduct.'82 Examples of misuse of corporate po-
sition cited in the comments to section 5.04 of the ALI Principles
of Corporate Governance include manipulating the corporation's
dividend policy for personal objectives and using corporate prop-
erty for personal benefit."s The improper personal benefit can
be received either from the corporation or a third person.
Section 5.11 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance
addresses the similar abuse of position by a controlling
177. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701.
178. Id. at 710.
179. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 200.
180. See id. § 5.04(a).
181. See id. § 5.04(a)(5).
182. See id. § 5.04(b); cf id. § 5.02(b).
183. See id. § 5.04 cmt. a.
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shareholder.'8 Misuse of position includes obtaining tax bene-
fits, influencing dividend policy,"R obtaining a profit from the
sale of property to the exclusion of others, and precluding compe-
tition." However, a controlling shareholder is generally per-
mitted to sell shares at a premium even if the shares constitute
a controlling block.'87 If a preliminary showing can be made
that the majority intended to exploit minority shareholders with
abusive or oppressive conduct, sections 5.04 and 5.11 of the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance apply. In such a case, the
majority has the burden of proving the fairness of the conduct,
unshielded by the business judgment rule.
C. Statutory Conflicting Interest Transactions
The 1991 Montana Business Corporation Act and the Model
Act create a safe harbor for interested director transactions
which consists of an outer harbor and an inner harbor." The
outer harbor protects transactions that may involve conflicts, but
that do not fall within the specific terms of the definitions. For
example, transactions with first cousins or more remote relatives
or transactions with purely social contacts do not present a con-
flict under the statute.' The inner harbor protects transac-
tions in which a director has a conflicting interest, but which
184. See id. § 5.11.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) (holding that the
controlling shareholders have a duty to deal fairly with non-controlling shareholders
in formulating dividend policy); Gabelli & Co. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261 (Del. Ch. 1982) (holding that failure to declare a dividend
is subject to the same equitable constraints as an affirmative dividend policy).
186. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 334.
187. But see id. § 5.16 (requiring disclosure to minority shareholders). In part,
this policy is based on empirical evidence that, at least in publicly-held companies,
premiums are generally not paid to obtain control for the purpose of exploiting non-
controlling shareholders. See id at 374-75.
188. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-461, -464 (1995). These sections were added
to the Model Act in 1988. As of December 31, 1992, Montana, along with Georgia,
Mississippi and Washington, adopted subchapter F of the Model Act. See PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 244. As of 1996, four more states,
Alabama, Arizona, Utah and Vermont, have been added to the list. See 3 MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.60 (Supp. 1996).
189. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(1) (1995). The Official Comments to sec-
tion 8.61(a) of the Model Act state that the intent of the section is to "wholly occupy
and preempt the field of directors' conflicting interest transactions." MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.61 cmt. 1 (1984). Accordingly, it would be difficult to argue that
Montana's constructive fraud statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (1995), is applica-
ble to a breach of the duty of fair dealing (or loyalty) by a director or officer. How-
ever, the statutory "safe harbor" is not available to controlling shareholders, so their
conduct could continue to be challenged under the constructive fraud statute.
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have been approved or ratified by qualified directors9 ' or
shareholders. 9 ' Where the transaction has not been approved
or ratified, the interested director or officer may still establish it
is fair to the corporation.'92
The definition of a conflicting interest in section 35-1-461 of
the Montana Code creates the outer harbor.13 The dense and
190. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-463(4) (1995). This section states:
For purposes of this section, 'qualified director' means, with respect to a
director's conflicting interest transaction, any director who does not have ei-
ther a conflicting interest respecting the transaction or a familial, financial,
professional, or employment relationship with a second director who does
have a conflicting interest respecting the transaction, which relationship
would, in the circumstances, reasonably be expected to exert an influence on
the first director's judgment when voting on the transaction.
Id.
191. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-464(5) (1995). This section provides:
For purposes of this section, 'qualified shares' means any shares entitled to
be voted with respect to the director's conflicting interest transaction except
shares that, to the knowledge, before the vote, of the secretary or other
officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes, are benefi-
cially owned by or the voting of which is controlled by a director who has a
conflicting interest respecting the transaction or by a related person of the
director, or both.
Id.
192. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(2)(c) (1995). The director having the con-
flict of interest is normally said to have the burden of proving the transaction was
fair.
193. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(1) (1995). This section states:
"Conflicting interest" with respect to a corporation means the interest a
director of the corporation has respecting a transaction effected or proposed
to be effected by the corporation or by a subsidiary of the corporation or
any other entity in which the corporation has a controlling interest if-
(a) regardless of whether the transaction is brought before the
board of directors of the corporation for action, the director knows
at the time of commitment that he or a related person is a party
to the transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in or is so
closely linked to the transaction and the transaction is of such
financial significance to the director or a related person that the
interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the
director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on the
transaction; or
(b) the transaction is brought, or is of a character and significance
to the corporation that it would in the normal course be brought,
before the board of directors of the corporation for action and the
director knows at the time of commitment that any of the follow-
ing persons is either a party to the transaction or has a beneficial
financial interest in or is so closely linked to the transaction and
the transaction is of such financial significance to the person that
the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on
the director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on
the transaction: (i) an entity, other than the corporation, of which
the director is a director, general partner, agent, or employee;
34
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convoluted wording of the section is more reminiscent of the
Internal Revenue Code than of corporate laws, and many of the
clauses in the definition should not affect smaller or medium-
sized companies or close corporations. For example, the law re-
quires that for a director to have a conflicting interest, he or she
must have had knowledge of the transaction at the time of com-
mitment; 9' however, the empire of most Montana companies is
not so far flung nor the chain of command so long that a director
would not have direct knowledge of virtually everything that
occurred. Similarly, the definition distinguishes between transac-
tions that came before the board or normally would be expected
to come before the board'95 and those of lesser significance.'
In most small or medium-sized businesses in which board
meetings are informal or do not occur, determining whether a
transaction would come before the board in the normal course of
business may be difficult.
According to the Official Comments to the Model Act, con-
flicting interest may arise in only three ways."9 The first, and
most obvious, is a transaction in which the director is a party
and has a beneficial interest.98 The transaction must affect a
pecuniary interest and be of such financial significance that it
"would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the
director's judgment."' Statutory conflicts do not include per-
sonal friendships or other social or religious affinities."°° For
(ii) a person who controls one or more of the entities specified in
subsection (lXbXi) or an entity that is controlled by, or is under
common control with, one or more of the entities specified in sub-
section (lXb)(i); or (iii) an individual who is a general partner,
principal, or employer of the director.
Id. (emphasis added).
The drafters of the 1991 amendments to the Montana Business Corporation
Act modified the Model Act slightly by adding the word "is" in subsections (a) and
(b) of the definition which seems innocuous but could be read so that the "closely
linked" phrase modifies the phrase "he or a related party" instead of "financial inter-
est." This could have the effect of slightly broadening the categories of persons who
have a conflicting interest.
194. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(lXa), (b) (1995).
195. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(lXb) (1995).
196. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(lXa) (1995).
197. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60, Off. Cmt. 1, Conflicting Interest; 2
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.60, at 8-396, -397 (Supp. 1996).
198. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(lXa) (1995).
199. Id.
200. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.23 cmt., at
27 (stating that "[it is not intended that a person would be treated as subject to a
controlling influence, and therefore interested, solely because of a long-time friendship
or other social relationship, or solely because of a long-time business association
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example, the Official Comments to the Model Act state that a
transaction between a director and the president of a golf club
that the director desperately wants to join is outside the conflict
of interest definition and beyond judicial inquiry. 1
The second type of transaction in which a director may be
interested is one in which a "related person" is a party.2 2 Re-
lated persons include spouses and spousal equivalents, children,
grandchildren and parents, but do not include cousins. The ABA
Committee amended the definition to include siblings of a spouse
after substantial criticism of an earlier draft, which allowed a
transaction with a director's brother-in-law to be beyond the
reach of the law.2" The language of the definition seems to in-
clude any transaction in which a related person has a beneficial
interest or is closely linked if the facts would "reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment."
The third category of conflicting interest includes transac-
tions with the entities specified in section 35-1-461(1) of the
Montana Code. The specified entities include: (1) an entity, other
than the corporation, of which the director is a director, general
partner, agent, or employee; (2) a person who controls one or
more of such entities or an entity that is controlled by, or is
under common control with, one or more of such entities; and (3)
an individual who is a general partner, principal, or employer of
the director.20 ' The director's involvement with the specified en-
tity must be economic, not merely social, and the entity must
"reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the director's
judgment.""°5
The inner harbor protects transactions approved by disinter-
through service on the same board of directors or other relationship not involving di-
rect pecuniary dealing").
201. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61(a) cmt 1; 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 8.61, at 8-415 (Supp. 1996).
202. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(3) (1995). A "Related person" is:
(a) the spouse or a parent or sibling of a spouse of the director;
(b) a child, grandchild, sibling, parent or spouse of any child, grandchild,
sibling, or parent of the director;
(c) an individual having the same residence as the director;
(d) a trust or estate of which an individual specified in this subsection (3)
is a substantial beneficiary; or
(e) a trust, estate, incompetent person, conservatee, or minor for whom the
director is a fiduciary.
Id.
203. See Branson, supra note 21, at 269-70.
204. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(lXbXi) to (iii) (1995).
205. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461 (1995).
[Vol. 58
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ested directors or disinterested shareholders, regardless of
whether the transaction is unfair."2° However, the actions of
the disinterested directors in approving a transaction are subject
to the good faith and duty of care standards required of directors
generally, including the business judgment rule.2" While the
inner safe harbor is not totally removed from judicial review, the
exceptions are extremely narrow.2" As suggested by the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance, the caveats to the bare stat-
utory provisions include a requirement that the disinterested
directors could reasonably have concluded that the transaction
was fair to the corporation at the time of the approval2" or, if
approved by disinterested shareholders, that the transaction
does not constitute a waste of corporate assets.21 °
If the transaction is not eligible for the inner safe harbor
because disinterested directors or shareholders do not approve it,
the interested director has the burden of proving that the trans-
action was fair to the corporation.21  A director who is also a
controlling shareholder will not be able to take advantage of the
safe harbor provisions because all rights of minority sharehold-
ers against a controlling shareholder are preserved.2
If the corporate ship begins to take on water notwithstand-
ing the safe harbors, it can still be bailed out by an ex post facto
review of the transaction by a newly appointed special litigation
committee of disinterested directors. 23 As noted above, the
bright line test to determine who is disinterested looks at pecuni-
ary interests, and, accordingly, the reviewing directors can in-
clude friends or acquaintances of the controlling sharehold-
ers.214 This review opens the door to a gutting of the derivative
action by directors who may be influenced by "cronyism, nepo-
tism, spite and slight" and has been sharply criticized.215 Spe-
cial litigation committees are notoriously favorable to manage-
ment and rarely, if ever, recommend that a suit be pursued
against an officer or director. William Lerach, a well-known
leader of the plaintiffs' bar, reported a few years ago that by his
206. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(2) (1995).
207. See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 cmt. 2.
208. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61 cmt. 2, 8.61(b).
209. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.02 cmt. a.
210. See id. § 5.02(a).
211. See id. § 5.02(b).
212. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61, at 8-422 (Supp. 1996).
213. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(2Xb) (1995).
214. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
215. Branson, supra note 21, at 277.
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count the score was 97-0 in favor of directorial recommendations
to dismiss suits against other directors.
216
D. As Applied to Montana Cases
In general, the Montana Supreme Court has decided cases
involving corporate law principles by applying, ad hoc, its sense
of equity, leaving practitioners unsure of which decisional frame-
work to apply to any case. In fairness to the court, the flood of
litigation that occurred elsewhere dried up before reaching Mon-
tana, and, thus, the court did not have the opportunity to devel-
op a coherent philosophy of its own.
2 17
In the early 1980s, earlier cases that tend to favor minority
shareholders were followed by cases that limit minority share-
holder rights. The Montana Supreme Court expanded, then sub-
sequently contracted, tort liability for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith.21s Similarly, in other commercial areas, an
initially activist attitude took on a more conservative posture.
The principal explanation for the apparent inconsistency be-
tween the court's laissez-faire attitude toward the conduct of
corporate directors, officers, and controlling shareholders and its
willingness to impose liability under the constructive fraud stat-
ute for breaches of fiduciary duty by bank officers and other
nontraditional fiduciaries is the court's deference to the business
judgment rule.219
While it is universally recognized that the business judg-
ment rule does not apply to duty of loyalty cases, even the Dela-
ware Supreme Court with its vast corporate case load has diffi-
culty distinguishing the duty of care from the duty of loyalty.
2 20
216. See id. at 276.
217. In addition to the sporadic case flow, there has been substantial turnover
on the Montana Supreme Court throughout this period. Since 1980, 18 justices have
occupied the Montana Supreme Court's seven seats.
218. See LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 96-108
(1990) (tracing the expansion and contraction of employment tort actions). The legis-
lature also played a part in limiting tort liability for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1995).
219. See also Kondelik v. First Fidelity Bank, 259 Mont. 446, 857 P.2d 687
(1993) (imposing liability on bank officer for breach of a fiduciary duty); Deist v.
Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984) (imposing liability on bank officer for
breach of a fiduciary duty); Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 221 Mont. 447, 720 P.2d
1148 (1986) (evaluating a franchisor-franchisee relationship); see generally, Jeffrey A.
Monhart, A Primer on the Developing Doctrine of Constructive Fraud in Montana, 52
MONT. L. REV. 153 (1991).
220. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director
[Vol. 58444
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Thus, the Montana Supreme Court's similar confusion at times
is not surprising. Still, for the most part, the Montana Supreme
Court's decisions have produced the same results that would be
reached if the court had applied the analytic constructs of the
new statutory definitions and the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance.
While the Montana Supreme Court has seen a full range of
corporate conflict of interest situations in the past two decades,
none of the cases have involved judicial review of a transaction
that was approved or ratified by disinterested directors or share-
holders.221 Accordingly, all of Montana's conflict of interest cas-
es have been decided solely on the basis of fairness.
1. Use of Corporate Assets and Compensation
Cases involving a purchase or sale of corporate assets where
a director or officer is a party to the transaction have been ap-
propriately decided by the Montana Supreme Court based on
settled legal principles, and the only issues of consequence to be
decided have been procedural or other issues peripheral to the
issues concerning breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Similarly, the
court has decided cases involving the use of corporate property
such as ranch houses, equipment, fuel, and supplies with little
difficulty by treating these perquisites as either de minimis or as
an element of compensation.223
More difficult is applying the duty of fair dealing to director
and officer compensation. While determining the amount of com-
pensation creates a direct conflict of interest, courts have gener-
ally applied somewhat more relaxed standards than those ap-
and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207 (1988).
Hanks states:
The phrase "duty of loyalty" appears nowhere . . . in the Delaware General
Corporation Law or, so far as is known, anywhere else in the corporate
statute of any other state. . . . Delaware courts are unclear as to the pa-
rameters of the duty of loyalty ... [and have] difficulty in distinguishing
the duty of care from the duty of loyalty.
Id. at 1212.
221. Cf MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-463, -464 (1995).
222. See, e.g., S-W Co., 179 Mont. 392, 587 P.2d 348 (discussing the transfer of
a residence and other assets).
223. See, e.g., Maddox, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230; Skierka, 192 Mont. 505, 629
P.2d 214. see generally 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §
5.02 cmt. c (setting forth exceptions to the rules requiring review of fairness and
special disclosure obligations, including a de minimis exception for trivial amounts
and an exception for purchases or sales that do not lend themselves to favored treat-
ment).
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plied to other interested party transactions. Unlike other trans-
actions in which an alternative arms-length party may be avail-
able, deciding director and officer compensation is a necessary
transaction in which substituting another party would present
collateral difficulties. As discussed above, the ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance devotes a separate section to compensa-
tion; however, the differences in its treatment of interested party
transactions are procedural rather than substantive.' While
the business judgment rule applies to approval of compensation
arrangements by disinterested directors, so-called "back-scratch-
ing" arrangements, in which directors vote to approve each
other's compensation as officers or employees, do not constitute
disinterested directors' actions.2"
The Montana Supreme Court has specifically held that the
appropriation of corporate assets for personal use without fair
consideration is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing."6 However, officers and directors often receive "perks"
from the corporation which can be characterized as compensation
and, thus, do not amount to a breach of duty as long as the ag-
gregate compensation is fair to the corporation.'
Several cases involving marital dissolution illustrate the
typical perquisites associated with ranch living. For example, in
In re Johnston,2" the corporation provided each of the share-
holder families with a home, food, vehicles, utilities, and insur-
ance.2" These perquisites were treated as a substantial income
supplement that was approximately equal to the monthly wages
and annual bonuses.' In a similar New Mexico case, a closely-
held family corporation passed a resolution which stated that
because the corporation required the around-the-clock presence
of corporate employees at the ranch, it was authorized to provide
its shareholders with food, housing, utilities, vehicles, gasoline,
medical insurance, and other benefits. 1 This compensation
plan worked smoothly until the husband and wife, who each
224. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.03.
225. See id. § 5.03 cmt. g.
226. See Fox, 198 Mont. at 211, 645 P.2d at 934 (grazing land rented to another
corporation controlled by a 50% shareholder at far less than the reasonable rental
value).
227. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.03(aX1).
228. 223 Mont. 383, 726 P.2d 322 (1986).
229. See In re Johnston, 223 Mont. at 384-85, 726 P.2d at 323.
230. See id. at 385, 726 P.2d at 324.
231. See McCauley, 724 P.2d at 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
446 [Vol. 58
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owned thirty percent of the stock, divorced. 2 The wife sued
the corporation for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty." She
also sought to compel an involuntary liquidation because she had
been oppressed by the majority shareholders by being denied the
"perks," excluded from management, and denied dividends even
though funds were available.' The New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals agreed and found that the corporation's conduct amounted
to oppression."
In another Montana case, Maddox v. Norman,"' the
eighty-five percent majority shareholder did not keep corporate
records or bank accounts separate from his personal assets, and
the evidence suggested that he was using corporate assets for
personal purposes."7 The trial court excused the shareholder's
"informal" method of accounting.' However, the Montana Su-
preme Court remanded for further proceedings including an
accounting for "corporate rental income, lease proceeds or loan
proceeds" for several years.' An accounting and return of the
appropriate amounts to the corporation is an appropriate remedy
for breach of the duty of fair dealing.
2. Exercise of Creditor and Contract Rights
While the foregoing examples of breaches of the duty of fair
dealing are straightforward, more complicated issues arise when
a corporation owes money to a shareholder. In Troglia v.
Bartoletti, ° the owners of two-thirds of the stock of a corpora-
tion purchased the escrow account that represented the debt
owed for the balance of the purchase price of a hotel, which was
the corporation's sole asset.2" The majority owners instructed
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 241. The court also considered the fact that the husband falsely
accused his former wife of embezzlement in a successful effort to convince the other
shareholders to remove her from the board of directors. See id. at 239.
236. 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
237. See Maddox, 206 Mont. at 5, 669 P.2d at 232-33.
238. See id. at 9, 669 P.2d at 234.
239. Id. at 17, 669 P. 2d at 238. Presumably, on remand, the shareholder was
able to demonstrate the amount that would have been due him as reasonable com-
pensation and would only be required to return the excess, if any. However, the
supreme court was more troubled by the majority shareholder's use of a portion of a
Federal Land Bank loan made to the corporation to pay for land and cattle pur-
chased in his individual capacity. See id. at 5-6, 669 P.2d at 232-33.
240. 152 Mont. 365, 451 P.2d 106 (1969).
241. See Troglia, 152 Mont. at 366-67, 451 P.2d at 107.
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the escrow agent to collect only interest on the note until further
notice.242 After the death of one of the majority owners, the mi-
nority shareholder sued to dissolve the corporation alleging mis-
management.2" Two years after the suit was initiated, the
majority shareholders instructed the escrow agent to begin col-
lecting the interest and principal due under the escrow agree-
ment.2" The minority shareholder tendered to the corporation
an amount equal to the interest, conditioned on the corporation
executing a note to him.'" The corporation refused the tender,
but made no other efforts to raise the funds necessary to avoid
default under the escrow.2" The Montana Supreme Court held
"that although a director occupies a fiduciary relation to the
stockholders, he is nevertheless entitled to demand payment of
an honest debt due him from the corporation of which he is a
director .... However, there are circumstances in which equity
will not permit him to do so.""'
The case was remanded to the district court for further pro-
ceedings to determine the financial condition of the corporation
and, presumably, whether it was in a position to raise sufficient
funds to avoid default.2" The court's decision was correct be-
cause the trial court record was not sufficient to determine
whether the majority shareholders' attempt to take title to the
asset as a consequence of the default was fair to the corporation.
The corporation should be required to make a good faith effort to
raise funds to avoid a forfeiture of title to the corporation's sole
asset. Instead, the majority shareholder rejected an offer by the
minority shareholder to fund the interest portion of the indebted-
ness, which is clearly a breach of the duty of fair dealing.2' 9
The issue arose again in McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-
242. See id. at 367, 451 P.2d at 107.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 369-370, 451 P.2d at 108 (citations omitted).
248. See id. at 371, 451 P.2d at 109. Similarly, the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance does not discuss the appropriate conduct of a director or officer who is
acting purely as a creditor of the corporation. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.04 cmt. c, at 257.
249. Assuming the majority shareholders did not offer the corporation the oppor-
tunity to purchase the escrow in the first instance, such purchase may have been a
breach of the duty of fair dealing in the form of a seizure of a corporate opportunity.
See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.05(b) and cmt. a. A
corporate opportunity "includes the acquisition or use of any contract rights or other
tangible or intangible property." Id.
448 [Vol. 58
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McCann25 when the corporation repaid a $25,000 note to the
parents of the majority shareholder a number of years before it
became due and resumed payments on a contract to the parents,
at the rate of $21,300 per year, though the parents may have
agreed to defer payment indefinitely. 1 At the same time, the
board of directors ceased paying dividends of $2,000 per month,
which had been paid for a number of years. 2 Because the sole
issue was valuation of the minority owner's shares, the record on
the issue of the corporation's breach of the duty of fair dealing
may not have been fully developed. Nonetheless, the repayment
of the debts to the parents of the majority shareholder was a
conflicting interest transaction within the meaning of section 35-
1-461(2) of the Montana Code because parents are related per-
sons.21 In the absence of approval by disinterested directors or
shareholders, the sole criteria for determining liability is the
fairness of the transaction to the corporation.' The fair mar-
ket value of long-term debt of a private corporation would typi-
cally be discounted so that the difference between the fair value
of the debt and the amount paid by the corporation could be
recovered as damages for a breach of the duty of fair dealing.
The 1983 case of Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall25 involved the
restructuring of a corporate obligation held by a controlling
shareholder. John Hall took control of Ski Yellowstone, Inc. by
subscribing to a "C" issue of shares at five cents per share for a
total purchase price of $401,000, which gave him a 50.7 percent
ownership of the corporation.2 '3 He paid twenty-five percent of
the price and agreed to pay the remainder shortly after comple-
tion of the offering. 1 7 At the time of the "C" share purchase,
four of the seven directors resigned and two personal friends of
250. 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239 (1996).
251. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-7, McCann Ranch, Inc. (No. 95-416).
252. See id.
253. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(3) (1995).
254. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(2)(c) (1995).
255. 202 Mont. 260, 658 P.2d 1071 (1983).
256. See Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 267-68, 658 P.2d at 1075-76. Although
Ski Yellowstone, Inc., was clearly undergoing financial stress and bank notes were
overdrawn, it is not clear that the corporation was insolvent, thus making its fiducia-
ry duties to creditors a factor. See id. at 268, 658 P.2d at 1076; see also BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 10, at 220.
257. See Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 268, 658 P.2d at 1075-76. Because the
"C" issue, as well as the earlier offerings, was made to all of the shareholders in
proportion to their then present holdings, there was no breach of the duty of fair
dealing. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.10 cmt. e,
at 329 (sales "at the same price and on the same terms" as transactions with third-
parties satisfies the burden of proving fairness).
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Hall were elected to fill the vacancies. As one of its first acts, the
new board, consisting of Hall, his two friends and two other
individuals, extended the payment date for the $300,000 that
Hall owed and adopted a two-tier budget, the effect of which was
to necessitate a further issue of stock to fund the immediate
needs of the corporation." An effort to raise $450,000 through
a "D" issue priced at five cents per share was unsuccessful, so
the board cut the price to one cent per share with twenty-five
percent of the purchase price due immediately and the remain-
der at the call of the directors. 9 The minority shareholders
brought a derivative action alleging misconduct by Hall and the
other two directors.
Under section 35-1-461(2) of the Montana Code, the modifi-
cation of the terms of the "C" issue purchase agreement with
Hall was a director's conflict of interest transaction. Under pres-
ent law, the disinterested directors or shareholders of Ski Yel-
lowstone could have approved the transactions and qualified for
the safe harbor of section 35-1-462 of the Montana Code.2" The
fact that two directors were personal friends of John Hall would
not have been sufficient to disqualify them from voting on the
contract modification in the absence of some other pecuniary
interest. If the transaction was within the safe harbor, it could
only be attacked on the ground that the directors' approval vio-
lated the duty of care and the business judgment rule. However,
no statutory safe harbor is available for controlling shareholder
conflicting interest transactions. Therefore, even if the directors
approved the transaction, it would not have been insulated from
court review.26' While the statutory safe harbor does not apply,
section 5.11 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance would
protect a similar transaction with the controlling shareholder if
approved by disinterested shareholders and shift the burden of
proof of the fairness issue to the party challenging the transaction.2"
258. See Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 268, 658 P.2d, at 1076.
259. See id. at 269, 658 P. 2d at 1076.
260. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-462 to -464 (1995). Two illustrations in the
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE are based on the facts in the Ski Roundtop
case. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.04 cmt. (e),
illus. 11 and 12, at 268, 281 n.11. The Reporters changed the facts in Illustration 11
to include approval by disinterested directors.
261. When a director is also a controlling shareholder, section 5.10 (Transactions
by a Controlling Shareholder with the Corporation) applies rather than section 5.02
(Transactions with the Corporation). See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 9, § 5.10 cmt. c, at 326.
262. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.11. The
commentary to § 5.11 (misuse of corporate position by controlling shareholders) states
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In its review of Hall's transactions with Ski Yellowstone,
Inc., the Montana Supreme Court stated that "the actions of the
board of directors in this case are to be measured by the busi-
ness judgment rule."2" It concluded that there was a legitimate
business purpose in the adoption of the two-tier budget, in mak-
ing the "D" issue, and in reducing the subscription price from
five cents to one cent.2" However, the court implied that there
was no similar business purpose for the deferral of payments of
the "C" issue by holding that the deferral was a breach of duty
and inappropriate self-dealing.2" This was a hollow victory at
best because the court limited the damages to the income the
corporation could have earned had it received timely pay-
ment.2 6
The measure of damages for a breach of duty (in the absence
of a provision in the articles of incorporation limiting liability of
directors) is either that for breach of an obligation other than a
contract2 7  or, at a minimum, the contract measure of
damages.2" Under the general breach of obligation provision,
that while controlling shareholders are free to use their voting power to elect direc-
tors, "it may be difficult" for directors who are also employees to maintain that they
are exercising "independent business judgment" because they may not be viewed as
disinterested in the action taken. Id at 336.
263. Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 273, 658 P.2d at 1078. The court's ringing
endorsement of the rule expressed in Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d
137, 143-44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975), follows:
The 'business judgment rule' immunizes management from liability in a
corporate transaction undertaken within both the power of the corporation
and the authority of management where there is a reasonable basis to
indicate that the transaction was made in good faith. An excellent state-
ment of the 'business judgment rule' is found in W. Fletcher § 1039 at
pages 621-25: 'It is too well settled to admit of controversy that ordinarily
neither the directors nor the other officers of a corporation are liable for
mere mistake or errors of judgment, either of law or fact. In other words,
directors of a commercial corporation may take chances, the same kind of
chances that a man would take in his own business. Because they are giv-
en this wide latitude, the law will not hold directors liable for honest er-
rors, for mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive and
in good faith, that is, for mistakes which may properly be classified under
the heading of honest mistakes. And that is true even though the errors
may be so gross that they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors
to manage the corporate affairs. This rule is commonly referred to as the
'business judgment rule.'
Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 273, 658 P.2d at 1071.
264. See Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 275-76, 658 P.2d at 1079.
265. See id. at 276-78, 658 P.2d at 1079-81.
266. See id. at 276, 658 P.2d at 1080.
267. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-317 (1995).
268. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1995).
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damages are the amount of detriment proximately caused by the
breach whether or not it could have been anticipated.2 9 Under
the contract measure of damages, the proximately-caused detri-
ment must have been likely to result from the breach "in the
ordinary course of things."27" The ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance express the measure of damages in more detail,
include a causation element, a foreseeability requirement, and a
provision for recovery of any gains derived by the defendant to
the extent necessary to make equitable restitution.27'
I Depending, of course, on facts not in the record, the breach
of duty by Hall may have been the proximate cause of the
corporation's inability to obtain financing from independent
sources. Once Hall demonstrated that he was not going to play
by the rules, his credibility could have been so damaged that
other sources of financing were no longer available. Similarly, if
the court could find that the breach of duty was the proximate
cause of the "D" issue of stock and that it would not have been
necessary if Hall had been required to pay for the "C" issue, it
could cancel the "D" issue shares as the minority shareholders
had requested.272
In rejecting the argument that issuing the "D" stock was
also a breach of duty, the court relied on the fact that the offer
at one cent per share was made to all the minority shareholders
as well as to John Hall.273 However, this argument is flawed
because payment was to be made "at the call of the board," and,
269. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-317 (1995).
270. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1995).
271. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.18. The
plaintiff must prove that proper conduct by the director or officer would have been a
substantial factor in averting the loss and that the likelihood of injury was foresee-
able to a similarly-situated, prudent person. The "substantial factor" element was de-
rived from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 431. See id. at 223. Losses incurred
by the corporation can also be offset by any gains to the corporation arising out of
the same transaction provided recognition of the gains is not contrary to public poli-
cy. See id. § 7.18(c).
Similar relief can be sought in an action for an accounting in a statutory close
corporation. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(lXe) (1995). The alternative relief pro-
vision of the Montana Business Corporation Act does not specifically provide for an
accounting but the broad authorization for a court to grant the relief it considers
appropriate would include the equitable remedy of an accounting to compel
disgorgement of profits. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (1995).
272. The "black letter" analysis and recommendations do not expressly provide
that rescission is an appropriate remedy for a transaction entered into in breach of
the duty of fair dealing. However, the commentary clearly recognizes the availability
of this remedy. See, e.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §
5.02 cmt. a.
273. See Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 274, 658 P.2d at 1078-79.
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therefore, the terms of the offer did not apply equally to Hall,
the majority shareholder, and the minority shareholders. Accord-
ingly, the court could have canceled the "D" issue as a rescissory
remedy for a second breach of duty.
274
The dissenting opinion by Justice Morrison correctly recog-
nizes that the business judgment rule does not apply in this case
and that Hall had the burden of proving that the questioned
transactions were fair and in good faith.275 Moreover, under the
current safe harbor provision, Justice Morrison's reliance on the
constructive fraud statute would probably still be valid.2 6
3. Dividend Policy and Employment
Some courts and commentators view dividend withholding in
close corporations as an element of oppression.2 77 Professor
O'Neal stated:
[T]he logic which supports judicial reluctance to interfere with
dividend policies in large corporations does not apply to close
corporations .... When it is also considered that in close corpo-
rations dividend withholding may be used to force out minority
shareholders, the traditional judicial restraint in interfering
with corporate dividend policy cannot be justified. "In fact, it
would not be too extreme to put the burden of proving the pro-
priety of its dividend policy on the controlling sharehold-
ers. -
278
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance also states that "a
director... or senior executive... may not use corporate prop-
erty, material non-public information or corporate position to
secure a pecuniary benefit" unless certain conditions are satis-
fied, including making the benefit proportionately available to all
other similarly-situated shareholders.279
274. The Reporters' Illustration 12 concludes that under similar facts the "D"
issue would be subject to the duty of fair dealing and the burden would be on the
directors to prove the fairness of the transaction. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.04 cmt. (e), at 268, 281 n.U.
275. See Ski Roundtop, Inc. 202 Mont. at 284, 658 P.2d at 1084.
276. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(2) (1995).
277. See, e.g., Fox, 198 Mont. 505, 645 P.2d 929.
278. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.05, at 26 n.2 (1985) (quoting from Henry G. Manne,
Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 280 (1967)).
279. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.04(a); see also
id. § 5.11(a) (discussing the use of a controlling shareholders position to obtain a
pecuniary benefit).
The ALI commentary states further:
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Many Montana cases involve some element of dividend with-
holding, either alone or in conjunction with excluding sharehold-
ers from participating in management.2 ° In Skierka v. Skierka
Brothers,2"' although the minority shareholder was not allowed
to participate in the corporate operations or given employment
and corporate perquisites, the corporation did not withhold any
dividends. However, in Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 2 the corporation
did not pay dividends, instead diverting income to other corpora-
tions owned by the controlling shareholder. In Daniels v. Thom-
as, Dean & Hoskins, Inc.,2" a real estate development corpora-
tion paid management fees to the operating corporation rather
than dividends. The corporation paid these amounts to the em-
ployees and shareholders of the operating corporation as bonus-
es.2 When Thomas terminated Daniels as an employee of the
operating corporation, his participation in bonuses, the
functional equivalent of dividends from the related real estate
development corporation, was also terminated. In McCann
Ranch, the decision to stop paying dividends coincided with the
issuance of a final divorce decree and the decision to repay debts
to the parents of the other shareholders.285
Based on the findings of fact in Skierka and Fox, the court
could have concluded that there was a breach of the duty of fair
dealing described in sections 5.04 and 5.11 of the Principles of
Corporate Governance through the withholding of dividends
coupled with a conscious policy by the controlling shareholders to
Where the complaint is that dividends have been improperly withheld, the
director will normally not have secured a benefit that would result in a
violation of § 5.04(a). However, the adoption of a conscious policy to distrib-
ute benefits to shareholders other than through payment of dividends will
violate § 5.04 if shareholders who are unable to take advantage of the
benefits do not receive some equivalent benefit. Furthermore, under certain
circumstances, failure to pay dividends may constitute a violation of §
5.04 .... [Un the case of a failure to pay a dividend in order to buy stock
for the benefit of a director or senior officer at an unfairly low price, a
court should find a violation of § 5.04 to have occurred.
Even in the absence of an affirmative action by a director that is clearly con-
trary to the interests of a minority shareholder, a court should be especially sensitive
to the use of dividend policy in the case of a closely held corporation as a device for
disadvantaging minority shareholders to the benefit of the majority shareholders. See
id.; see, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Elec. Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
280. See, e.g., McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239; Fox, 198 Mont.
201, 645 P.2d 929; Skierka, 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214.
281. 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
282. 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
283. 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990).
284. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 129, 804 P.2d at 361.
285. See McCann Ranch, Inc., 276 Mont. at 206, 915 P.2d at 239.
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distribute the benefits to themselves in some other manner,
thereby securing a disproportionate pecuniary benefit. In Daniels
and McCann Ranch, there were no judicial findings, but the
general background of the cases suggests that because dispropor-
tionate benefits were received by the controlling shareholder, the
court may have had a basis for a further finding that the control-
ling shareholders had a "conscious policy to divert the benefit of
the dividends to themselves indirectly."' As in all other cases
involving the duty of fair dealing, once the party challenging the
action makes a preliminary showing of a "conscious policy" to
secure a disproportionate benefit, the business judgment rule
should not apply.
In Daniels, the employment aspects of Daniels' claims
against Thomas Dean & Hoskins involving wrongful discharge
and breach of good faith were bifurcated from the claim for an
appraisal. 7 However, one may infer from the decision that if
the employment claims were presented in the corporate context,
the court would have applied the business judgment rule to the
circumstances surrounding the discharge. Justice Sheehy, with
the benefit of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, would
surely have agreed that Thomas used his corporate offices and
status as a controlling shareholder to obtain a pecuniary benefit
and that the business judgment rule does not apply.' Howev-
er, the court may simply have not been satisfied that Thomas'
discharge of Daniels was motivated by a conscious policy to se-
cure a disproportionate benefit.
4. Share Repurchases
Also in Daniels, the Montana Supreme Court thoroughly
addressed the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder.'
The court looked at the propriety of Thomas' actions as the presi-
dent and thirty-nine percent stockholder in negotiating the pur-
chase of Daniels' shares on behalf of the corporation. As an offi-
cer and a director, Thomas had a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
286. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §§ 5.04, 5.11. Sec-
tions 5.04 and 5.11 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance do not expressly
extend to the use of corporate position to obtain a pecuniary benefit for a related
party. See id. Whether the repayment of debts to the parents of the majority share-
holders was a direct pecuniary benefit to the majority shareholders would depend
upon a detailed factual showing.
287. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 130, 804 P.2d at 362.
288. See id. at 148-49, 804 P.2d at 373 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
289. See Daniels, 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990).
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tion, and, as a controlling shareholder, he also had a duty to the
minority shareholders. However, the repurchase of Daniels'
shares was not strictly a "director's conflicting interest transac-
tion," as defined by the Montana Business Corporation Act, be-
cause the interests of Thomas and the corporation were not ad-
verse. Section 35-1-461(2) of the Montana Code does not apply if
the director does not have a conflicting interest. Accordingly,
Thomas is protected by the outer safe harbor, with two excep-
tions. First, the safe harbor only protects the director from "an
award of damages or other sanctions.., in a proceeding by a
shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation because a
director ... has an interest in the transaction."29 ° If the liabili-
ty arises in some other manner, such as for a failure to disclose
material information, the safe harbor does not protect the direc-
tor. Second, the statutory safe harbor is not available to control-
ling shareholders.
In Daniels, the corporation had five stockholders: Thomas
and Dean each owned thirty-nine percent; Daniels owned seven
percent; and two others owned the remaining fifteen percent.
Without explanation, possibly because it did not affect the result
of the opinion, the Montana Supreme Court elected to treat
Thomas as the majority owner.29' The couft would have
reached the same result had it applied the control concepts from
the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance. Under the ALI
Principles, a "controlling shareholder" is defined as a person who
either alone, or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding
with one or more other persons, owns or has power to vote fifty
percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of the corpora-
tion or who otherwise exercises a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the corporation.292 An owner of
twenty-five percent or more of the outstanding stock is presumed
to exercise control unless some other person, either alone or
pursuant to an arrangement or agreement, owns or has the pow-
er to vote a greater percentage.29 Because no one owned more
stock than Thomas, he would have had to show that other per-
sons acting pursuant to an arrangement or agreement exercised
290. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(1) (1995).
291. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 138, 804 P.2d at 367 (determining "that Thomas
was a majority shareholder . . . for the purpose of this appeal" and stating "[t]o hold
otherwise would ignore the realities of the situation in this close corporation and rely
merely upon technicalities").
292. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.10(a).
293. See id. § 1.10(b).
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control.
As a further twist to the conflict of interest analysis, the
Montana Supreme Court determined that Thomas did not have a
conflict of interest because he offered to "step aside" and let a
non-shareholder employee of the related operating corporation
handle the negotiations with Daniels.29' Neither the Model Act
nor the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance directly deals
with the ability of a director or controlling shareholder to dele-
gate the decision-making function to a subordinate employee.
Due to the employment relationship, the non-shareholder em-
ployee would not be a "qualified director" who could approve a
transaction with another interested director.295 However, he
would probably be considered an "associate" of the controlling
shareholder as such term is defined in section 1.23 of the Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance.29 Under the commentary to the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, it would be difficult to
establish that his decisions would be protected by the business
judgment rule.297
The District Court found that Thomas breached his fiduciary
duty to Daniels by inducing him to leave his employment while
representing that Daniels would receive "fair value" for his stock
and by not disclosing what he meant by that term.29s This re-
sult is supported by a Delaware case in which the facts showed a
freeze-out merger at twenty-one dollars per share, and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that the failure to disclose an internal
corporate study recommending that the corporation could pay up
to twenty-four dollars per share violated the duty of fair deal-
ing.299
294. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 139, 804 P.2d at 367.
295. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-463(4) (1995); see also 1 PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.23 (defining "interested").
296. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.23(aX2) (in-
cluding a person "with respect to whom a director, senior executive, or shareholder
has a business, financial, or similar relationship that would reasonably be expected
to affect the person's judgment").
297. See id. § 5.11 cmt. c, at 336 (stating that "it may be difficult for directors
of the controlled corporation who are employees of the controlled or controlling corpo-
ration to defend their actions as the exercise of independent business judgment, be-
cause they may not be viewed as disinterested in the action taken"); see also id. §
1.23 cmt. 10 (using "associate" to describe the types of persons to whom a director,
senior executive, or shareholder bears a sufficiently close familiar relationship, or has
a sufficiently substantial financial, business, or similar relationship, that knowing
advancement of the person's interest by the director, senior officer, or shareholder
can be treated as equivalent to knowing advancement of the director's, senior
officer's, or shareholder's own interest).
298. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 135, 804 P.2d at 365.
299. See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (finding that
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The black letter law stated in the ALI Principles generally
requires disclosure of material facts, and the comments state
that interested parties are not obligated to volunteer the maxi-
mum amount they are willing to pay or the minimum amount
they are willing to accept."° However, this rule assumes that
the corporation has an equal opportunity to access market infor-
mation concerning prices and that special circumstances may
change this rule.30' The comments also point out that a fair
price is often a range rather than a single number and that dis-
closure of a particular fact could cause the corporation to negoti-
ate for a lower price.3 2 The interested director has a duty to
explain the implications of the transaction.3" In an appraisal
rights context, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance re-
quires a director to disclose his or her belief as to the fair value
of minority shares and the basis for such belief.3 ' By these
standards, Thomas should have disclosed the internal estimate
of the price before Daniels changed his position, relying on some
expectation of a higher value.3"
With respect to share repurchases, the ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance are generally not as helpful in analyzing
the standards of conduct of controlling shareholders in relation
to non-controlling shareholders as they are in analyzing the
duties of controlling shareholders to the corporation. Two sec-
tions, 5.11 and 7.25, are potentially applicable to share repur-
chases. Section 5.11 discusses "use by a controlling shareholder
of its controlling position to secure a pecuniary advantage," but
limits damages to the amount of the improper benefit received
and any foreseeable harm caused by the controlling shareholders
"[miaterial information, necessary to acquaint those shareholders with the bargaining
positions of Signal and UOP, was withheld under circumstances amounting to a
breach of fiduciary duty" and concluding that the merger did not meet the test of
fairness).
300. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 1.14 cmt. r,
at 17.
301. See id.
302. See id. § 5.02 cmt. d, at 215.
303. See id. The duty of disclosure is found in other contexts involving a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2Xe)
(1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. f (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958).
304. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.25(a)(2)
(adopting the Delaware rule for freeze-out mergers).
305. See also infra notes 313-17 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of a
controlling shareholder to make a good faith offer at fair value in a "freeze-out"
merger or other transaction in control to which the controlling shareholder is a par-
ty).
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conduct.3" In Daniels, while Thomas' buying out a minority
shareholder at an unfairly low price would seem to confer a
pecuniary benefit on him and the remaining shareholders, the
question is whether Thomas' negotiating tactics amount to an
abuse of power. The commentary to section 5.11 of the Principles
of Corporate Governance gives examples of situations not cov-
ered by the rule, such as where the benefit resulting from the
use of controlling power is made proportionately available to the
other similarly-situated shareholders.0 7 Justice Barz, writing
for the Montana Supreme Court in Daniels, expressed a similar
concern, noting that Thomas had a fiduciary duty to the other
minority shareholders in his negotiations with Daniels."R How-
ever, because Daniels was not similarly situated, this concern for
the minority shareholders does not resolve the issue.3" The
Montana Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of two Massa-
chusetts cases.31 The Massachusetts cases held that while the
fiduciary duty between stockholders of a close corporation is one
of "utmost good faith and loyalty,"31' if the control group can
"demonstrate a legitimate business purpose and the minority
stockholders cannot demonstrate a less harmful alternative," it
can proceed with the transaction."S
Transactions in which the interests of minority shareholders
are extinguished could also fall under section 7.25 of the Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance, which addresses transactions such
as a "freeze-out" merger in which a controlling shareholder is a
party."5 Since a repurchase of minority shares under some
form of coercion or pressure from the controlling shareholder,
i.e., a squeeze-out, is analogous to a "freeze-out" merger,314 sec-
tion 7.25 should be helpful in determining the standards that
should apply to a "squeeze-out."3 The section requires the di-
306. Although Thomas was authorized by the board of directors to offer $35,000,
the highest offer was $25,000. Daniels requested, and the district court awarded him,
$53,128. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 139-40, 804 P.2d at 367-68.
307. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 334.
308. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 138, 804 P.2d at 367.
309. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.11(c).
310. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
311. Daniels, 246 Mont. at 137, 804 P.2d at 366.
312. Id. at 138, 804 P.2d at 366.
313. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 5.11 cmt. a,
at 344 (stating that this section is not meant to preclude transactions between par-
ent and subsidiary corporations in which the interests of minority shareholders in
the subsidiary are extinguished).
314. Freeze-out mergers are authorized by MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-813 (1995).
315. See also 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.21,
1997] 459
53
Oitzinger: Fair Price and Fair Play
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
460 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
rectors approving the transaction to have a reasonable belief that
the offer to the minority shareholders in the transaction consti-
tutes fair value and disclose the basis for that belief.16 Courts
are instructed to "give substantial weight to the highest realistic
price that a willing, able, and fully informed buyer would pay for
the corporation as an entirety."
317
A freeze-out typically takes place through a merger, during
which the minority shareholders can be paid cash, obligations or
other property in exchange for their shares."' Assent to a
merger normally requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
outstanding shares.39 However, in cases in which the parent
company owns eighty percent or more of the subsidiary, the
merger can proceed without a vote by the shareholders of either
corporation. The Official Comment to section 11.01 of the Model
Act notes that under the new act, there are virtually no restric-
tions or limitations on the terms of the merger. 3 0 A corporation
may compel the holders of a single class of shares to receive
different types of consideration: some may receive securities or
cmt. h, at 312. This section states:
A number of states have developed a remedy for oppression . . . in order to
protect minority shareholders whose reasonable expectations have been frus-
trated and who have no adequate means of recovering their invest-
ment .... [citations omitted] Although the remedy in such case is normally
dissolution, some statutes effectively convert dissolution into an appraisal-
like remedy by granting the corporation or other shareholder the right to
purchase the shares of the party seeking dissolution at a judicially deter-
mined fair value .... [citation omitted] In administering such a remedy,
the court might properly look to the procedures and standards specified in
this Chapter (sections 7.21-7.25) for the determination of fair value.
Id.
316. See id. § 7.25(a)(1) (providing standards for fair value). The section also
provides that an appraisal proceeding is the sole recourse for shareholders of a pub-
licly held corporation to challenge such a transaction, but the exclusivity provisions
do not apply to close corporations. See id. § 7.25(d).
317. Id. § 7.22(c) cmt. c.
318. Under section 35-1-813(2) of the Montana Code, the plan of merger must
set forth:
(a) the name of each corporation planning to merge and the name of the
surviving corporation into which each other corporation plans to merge; (b)
the terms and conditions of the merger; and (c) the manner and basis of
converting the shares of each corporation into shares, obligations, or other
securities of the surviving corporation or any other corporation or into cash
or other property in whole or part.
319. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-815(5) (1995) (subject to exceptions noted in
the statute).
320. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.01, Off. Cmt. The corresponding
provision of the Montana Business Corporation Act is MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-815
(1995).
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properties while others may accept different securities, cash, or
property.
321
Under the ALI Principles, a freeze-out merger alone
amounts to a per se breach of the duty of fair dealing.322 The
Official Comment to the Model Act concedes that "merger trans-
actions that are formally authorized by the procedures set forth
in this chapter may in some circumstances constitute a breach of
duty to minority shareholders where the effect of the transaction
is to eliminate them from further equity participation in the
enterprise." 323
The fiduciary duty that is applied to these transactions is
uniformly the duty of fair dealing and not the duty of care with
its attendant business judgment rule.3"4 "The danger in these
transactions is that 'a self-interested majority stockholder or
control group [will rule] unfairly' in many cases precludes busi-
ness judgment rule protection."3M The Delaware Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.326 sets
out the "entire fairness test" for a freeze-out merger, which in-
cludes both substantive and procedural fairness. "[H]owever, the
test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing
and fair price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a
whole since the question is one of entire fairness."32 7
Where there is a conflict of interest and the potential for an
abuse of corporate position, the "less harmful alternative" test
can be read as a modification of the business judgment rule. In
Daniels, the Montana Supreme Court applied a balancing test
and determined that while Thomas had demonstrated that the
corporation "could not afford" the price that Daniels was seeking,
Daniels had not demonstrated a "less harmful alternative."32
As noted above, the court determined that Thomas did not have
a conflict of interest and held that he acted "prudently and in
321. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.01, Off. Cmt. The comment and
the new law recognize that essentially the same results could be achieved by struc-
turing the transaction in a more complex matter.
322. The strict valuation rules in § 7.25 apply whether or not the case law in a
particular jurisdiction requires an independent business purpose for the freeze-out
merger. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.25 cmt. a,
at 382.
323. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.01 Off. Cmt. 1, at 11-2.
324. See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 151-159.
325. Id. at 158 (quoting Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement
of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1358 (1978)).
326. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
327. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
328. See Daniels, 246 Mont. at 139-40, 804 P.2d at 366.
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accordance with the business judgment rule."3" Despite the
dicta regarding good faith and prudent business judgment, this
was simply a dispute over money-Daniels wanted more and
Thomas wanted to pay less. The critical finding made by the
supreme court was that the corporation could not afford to pay
Daniels what he wanted. This finding was contrary to the find-
ing of the district court and was not discussed in the opinion. If
the price paid to Daniels was in fact a fair price, the duty of fair
dealing would be satisfied regardless of whether Thomas had a
conflict of interest or breached the duty not to self-deal.3" The
significant conflict issue is to determine which party has the
burden of proof on the fairness issue. For example, if the trans-
action was an arms-length transaction, Thomas could get away
with paying an unfairly low price to Daniels. The Daniels deci-
sion seems contrary to current analysis and should be limited to
its facts, including the unaffordability of the payment.
Under the facts of Daniels and McCann Ranch, there would
seem to be a basis for finding that the minority shareholders
were "squeezed out" of their stock positions. Daniels was offered
what seemed to be a promotion that would have necessitated his
relocation to another city. He declined and was discharged a
short time later. He did not initiate the series of events that led
to the sale of his shares. Thomas exerted considerable leverage
to extract a price concession including withholding a waiver of a
non-complete agreement and threats to take action to devalue
the shares if Daniels did not sell out. Similarly, the cessation of
dividend payments at a time when the controlling shareholders
knew the minority shareholder needed the money seemed to
determine the timing of the transaction in McCann Ranch. If
there are facts demonstrating what is essentially a forced liqui-
dation, the rules stated in section 7.25 of the Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance for a per se breach of the duty of fair dealing
should apply. The price determination would then be made at
the "highest realistic price" that the experts should establish.331
329. Id. at 139, 804 P.2d at 367.
330. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §§ 5.10,
5. 11(a)(1).
331. See id. §§ 7.22(c), 7.25; see also id. at § 5.04. Illustration 7 involves the
discharge of a minority shareholder without cause coupled with a cessation of divi-
dends for the purpose of forcing the minority shareholder to sell shares back to the
corporation as a demonstration of a breach of duty under section 5.04. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The legislature has attempted to adopt the most recent ver-
sion of various model business organization acts. The sweeping
amendments to these acts are not the result of decisions or busi-
ness conditions in Montana, but reflect the broad national expe-
rience and, at times, the reaction of a particular segment of the
legal community that drafts the model laws.332 Practitioners
and the Montana Supreme Court should review the prior cases
with care and use the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance as
an analytic guide to help determine which decisions should be
followed and which should be discarded. In the words of Ray
Garrett, Jr. the initial director of the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, "where there is no judicial authority, or where the cases
are unsatisfactory by modern standards-either because of their
antiquity, or the absence of compelling analysis, or because to-
day, they just seem wrong-resort must be had to other sourc-
es."' While hard cases and difficult decisions may not be
made easier, use of the terminology and logic from the ALI Prin-
ciples in setting forth the rationale for decisions will make
Montana's corporate jurisprudence uniform with that of the rest
of the nation.'
In particular, practitioners and the court should recognize
that McCann Ranch is contrary to the weight of authority in
other states on the valuation issue. For purposes of the
dissenters' rights statutes and fair value determinations in disso-
lution cases, all shares of the corporation should be treated as
being of equal value. The proportionate share of enterprise value
accords with the majority of other jurisdictions and with the ALI
Principles. If the majority shareholders are determined to initi-
ate the freeze-out, or otherwise abuse their majority status, then
the standards for determining value should be based upon the
highest price that a willing, able and fully informed buyer would
pay for the corporation as an entity.
Abuses of corporate position through a "conscious policy" to
secure disproportionate benefits by withholding of dividends or
332. For example, the Model Act adopted in Montana in 1991 contains provisions
governing the termination of derivative suits that have been adopted in only a few
states. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
333. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at XIX.
334. Montana courts should not, however, feel bound to follow the law of other
jurisdictions, as indicated by an Oklahoma case. See Woolf, 849 P.2d 1093 (construing
the Oklahoma Corporation Code, which is based on the Delaware Code).
335. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.22(c).
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denying participation in management is a breach of the duty of
fair dealing under the ALI Principles. The application of ALI
Principles in cases of abuse of corporate positions can be a sub-
stitute for the less precise "oppression" or "reasonable expecta-
tions" analysis. Under either formulation, the business judgment
rule should not be applied to situations that involve self-dealing.
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